In competitive markets, price is a bit like a game, typified by the ‘prisoners dilemma’ of game theory, where two players acting in their own self-interest will result in a suboptimal outcome for both.
In the classic scenario, you have two people, suspects of a crime held in separate rooms with no means to communicate.
The copper tells each of them that if they confess and testify and the other does not, you will go free.
If you do not confess and the other does, you will get the maximum sentence of 3 years.
If both confess you will both be sentenced to 2 years.
If neither confesses, there is enough evidence to have you both serve 1 year.
The result is that if the prisoners act out of self-interest, the result is worse than if they had cooperated.
When you consider this in a competitive duopoly market, to keep it simple: what happens if one party cuts its price?
The other has the choice of cutting theirs to match, which inevitably results in less profit for both if competitor two cuts their price in response. However, if the reaction of the second mover is to keep their prices up, they might sell less, but very probably make more profit. The price cutter will be relying on selling more at the lesser price to increase profit, or grabbing market share which is usually the driver, because of the added volumes.
Given most organisations have KPI’s around sales volumes, the temptation to cut prices in the face of competitive activity is almost irresistible, despite the profit impact which is often ignored.
The Fountain Tomato sauce story: I joined Cerebos back in 1981. Fountain Tomato sauce had a share in NSW of about 40% of volume and 50% of value. Fountain sold for .72 cents for the 600ml bottle, I remember the numbers well. A short time after I joined, discounter Franklins brought out No Frills tomato sauce, on shelf for .69 cents,
The sales force was in a panic, as Fountain was a big part of their sales and they insisted that we had to drop the price to match No Frills or lose huge volumes.
I did the numbers, and convinced the marketing manager, and MD to overrule the sales manager, and we put the price of Fountain up, so it was on shelf at .81 cents, and we started advertising: ‘Rich Red Fountain Tomato Sauce’
The logic was that Fountain at .72 and No Frills at .69, were very close, so the consumer found it sensible and easy to save a few cents, as after all, they must be pretty much the same if the price was so similar.
However, at a price difference of .12 cents, very substantial in percentage terms, but not particularly significant in the mix of a weekly shop, consumers figured that they had to be very different. Fountain had to be the far better product, and the advertising we did confirmed that view. More tomatoes, no filler, ‘Rich Red Fountain tomato sauce’. Our volumes did drop marginally, and our profits went up.
This outcome was not just instinct, it was based on research and experience.
‘No Frills’ margarine was the very first cheap housebrand on the Australian market. It was proposed and supplied by the business that at the time owned Meadow Lea margarine, my employer. I had done quite a bit of research after the launch of No Frills margarine to understand the consequences, and so was lucky to be in a position where I had some understanding of the dynamics that were at play, without at that time having any solid idea of the psychology that drove them.
Later, both Fountain and Meadow Lea allowed the retailers to dictate their strategies, so redirected advertising funds into price promotions, boosting the retailers margins and destroying their brands. Both Fountain and Meadow Lea are now just ‘also-rans’ in their markets, (judging by shelf presence) and neither would be anywhere near as profitable as they were in their heyday.
The lesson is that the intense pressure to reduce price as a competitive reaction is almost always a very bad choice. Resist the pressure and protect profit, without which you will be out of business.
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