Your pricing architecture should be driven by your business model.
Your tactical pricing decisions should be driven by the immediate competitive and market pressures.
They are different, and while not mutually exclusive, are, or should be, largely separate.
Business models generally evolve slowly, so pricing architecture changes slowly with them, but the tactical needs can vary daily.
Get the two mixed up at your peril.
Years ago I was in a meeting with the MD of the business I was working for, the GM of sales, and a senior manager of one of the retail gorillas, who was trying to extract substantial trading term concessions from us. The sales personnel had been under extreme pressure for some time, but had resisted successfully. The MD was ‘summonsed’ as a last resort by the retailer. Towards what became the end of the meeting, the retailer played the ‘ego card’. He observed that he had thought the MD had the authority to make decisions, but it seemed he had been wrong. The MD, sensitive to challenges to his ego, responded that he was indeed the man who had the veto authority, and proceeded to agree with some face saving but essentially useless caveats. This changed in a moment the pricing architecture of the business for the worse.
It proved to be a profound strategic mistake.
Sales people are often given the authority to vary prices tactically, but should never be given the authority over the architecture. Not because they cannot negotiate, but because they should be kept entirely separate to maintain the integrity of the pricing architecture and the connection to strategy.
In the story related above, the Sales manager had been explicitly denied the right to offer changes to the architecture without agreement of others in the senior management group, but retained complete tactical authority. This meant that there were agreed limits and trade-offs that he, and those who reported to him could make during a negotiation. This tended to hamper potential (read ‘promised’ by the retailer) volumes, but cushioned margin and ensured similar customers were receiving the same terms, within which the sales force was able to vary tactically to leverage our position as best they could. The MD by contrast had the power over the architecture, and the concession on the architecture completely moved the tactical ‘needle’ against us.
It is very hard in a highly contested market to move prices up, and very easy to move them down. The change in architecture moved the whole field for negotiation down which substantially impacted on long term margins. In addition, it also confirmed in the retailers mind that the ‘bottom line’ for the sales force could be further moved by challenging the architecture.
That business, sadly, no longer exists.
