Aug 16, 2024 | AI, Governance, Strategy
AI is the newest, shiniest thing we have seen since, well, perhaps ever, at least in the speed with which it has overtaken consciousness.
ChatGPT was released to the ‘wild’ in November 2022. In commercial terms, yesterday.
In that time, it has overtaken discussion, business planning, capability questions, and profoundly changed the face of stock markets.
An amazing outcome for a technology without a business model.
The committed AI infrastructure spending over the next year by the big 5 LLM builders, OpenAI, Amazon, Microsoft, Amazon and Google is over $200 billion. Depending on your sources, this might vary a bit, but may even be on the low side. It does not count the billions being spent by everybody else, largely on setting about leveraging the ‘infrastructure’ delivered by the LLM’s.
Again, depending on your sources, the revenues being generated over the next year by AI suppliers, both of the infrastructure and tools rapidly becoming available is probably $20 billion.
Nowhere in history has there been a tsunami of investment of this size and speed in the absence of a solid business model. There is no clear way forward to generating a return on that investment.
This is the equivalent to a goldrush, except, in a gold rush if you were the lucky one to find those elusive nuggets, you had some idea what they were worth, and an established way of monetising the metal.
Nothing of the sort exists with AI.
I have done plenty of capital proposals in my time, some with forecasts that bordered on the wildly optimistic because I believed a change of some sport would be generated by the object of that Capex. In my wildest dreams, I have never proposed anything like the ratio of capex to current revenue exhibited by this investment.
There is confusion around the term ‘Trillion’. Historically, the US and UK definitions differed, the UK version being 10^18, 1,000 times larger than the US trillion which is to the power of 12, or one million million. I explain this for clarity and comparative purposes.
On current stock market valuations (August 2024) Nvidia, a business few had heard of a year ago, is the most valuable company on earth with a valuation of US3.2Trillion. They trade places regularly with Apple for the No. 1 spot. Currently Apple is number 2, also at a rounded 3.2 trillion, but a few tens of millions behind Nvidia. Microsoft is third with 3.1 trillion, followed by Amazon at 1.9, and Meta at 1.3. The comparison I wanted to highlight is with the GDP of Australia, of US1.7 trillion. Australian GDP is just over half the market valuation of Nvidia and Apple, a sobering thought.
An investment of 200 billion against current revenues of 20 billion is simply the biggest financial gamble in the history, by a logarithmic amount.
The people running these massive businesses are not stupid. They see and are betting their companies (and they are ‘their’ companies, as control is in a very few hands) on massive returns, which means in turn that the fabric of everything we see and do must change, very quickly. The business models will change, and they will not be just everybody subscribing for modest monthly amounts to the latest LLM model. There will have to be whole new industries being ‘invented’ with successful business models in place for there to be a return on the capex being deployed.
The windows of opportunity that will open, and close just as quickly, over the next decade are immense.
No wonder there is a gold rush, it is just the location of the gold still in question.
Mar 7, 2022 | Change, retail, Strategy
The supermarket business model, like most others, is evolving as we watch. It is slower in Australia than elsewhere given the challenge of distance and the stranglehold of Coles and Woolies. Nevertheless, it is evolving, and we can learn from elsewhere.
Four years ago, with great fanfare, Tesco in the UK launched a discount supermarket chain they called ‘Jack’s’. It was intended to compete with discounters Aldi and Lidl, to be the British hammer blow on the invading German discount retailers.
At the time, it seemed to me that the game was already up, that the position the discounters had carved in the market would be impervious to the exhortations of then Tesco MD David Lewis, calling Britain to arms.
Prior to the launch of Jacks, there was considerable shuffling of deck chairs as other retailers, Sainsbury and Asda particularly adjusted to the discounters by M&A. Since then of course we have had the fiasco of Brexit, still evolving amongst the shattered supply chains. This has been graphically illustrated by the carnage at the port of Dover, and inability of British farmers to farm in the absence of eastern European labour.
Now Jacks is closing, its promises of stores in every major town never eventuating. Jacks only ever opened thirteen stores, six of which will be converted to Tesco, the other seven just closed.
At the time in a post I reminisced on the demise of discounters in Australia, saying ‘I suspect history will reveal that Tesco has made a huge blue’. At least they recognised the mistake relatively early and reversed course under a new MD.
Given Australia tends to follow the evolution of the British supermarket sector by a year or two, what can we anticipate domestically, particularly from the two current retail gorillas, Woolies and Coles?
- I would not expect either to make the mistake Tesco made and open a discounter. In the past, both have dabbled with discount retail brands, none of which have survived. Besides, they have both watched as Aldi has carved out a place without launching a discount rival, it is unlikely they will change direction now.
- The doubling down on home delivery will continue, as will the logistic arrangements that support home delivery, and the technology that enables it.
- Retail is fragmenting. Consumer behaviour is evolving rapidly, accelerated by Covid. There is an obvious trend towards on-line and specialist retail using multiple channels of distribution, attracting consumers from their large-scale competitors by offering other than ‘average’ products. Some retailers are designing their stores as an ‘experience’ as much as a place to shop. These stores are a brick in the brand building wall, and are in effect, another form of media as well as a retail outlet. Apple saw this first, opening stores progressively around the world. By the traditional retail measure of success of margin/sq foot, Apple is now the most successful retailer in the world. At the other end, we see small stores, even ‘pop-ups’ selling very specific and focussed ranges. In between, shopping malls have passed their peak, the massive floor space they occupy will need to be re-purposed, at least in part. The potential here is for locally focussed office and residential hubs with a mix of specialist stores and entertainment venues.
- Direct to consumer from the farm is increasingly possible and attractive. Farmers markets will continue to grow and nibble away at the supermarket share of produce, by delivering superior taste and quality. I love so called ‘summer fruit’, peaches, nectarines, and plums. Finding any in a supermarket that do not feel and taste like a cricket ball is impossible, as they are picked in bulk and green to survive the supermarket supply chain. They may look OK, but the taste is what really counts, and here they miss out badly to specialist stores.
- Harris Farm has considerable potential if they can resist the temptation to become more like a ‘chain’. Woolies had a go at high quality specialist food retailing with Thomas Dux, and at first got the recipe right. Sadly, success breeds intervention by the back office boys who never actually see a customers, which resulted in ‘Dux’ being sent to the naughty corner to die.
- Automation in big distribution centres will continue to drive costs out of the system. Ocado, the British online grocer is licencing their technology around the world. Coles did a deal with them back in 2019 to build two automated fulfilment centres, which will feed into their home delivery strategy and no doubt generate a lot of thinking for the standard supermarket Distribution Centre logistics chain.
- Aldi will continue to grow, more slowly than to date, as they expand store numbers in an already saturated market. Costco with currently thirteen locations around Australia have the potential to double in the next few years. Their differentiator is an entirely different business model, which is very hard to copy for any established retailer.
- The demise of proprietary brands in Australian FMCG has probably reached its lowest point. Coles and Woolies have ransacked the profitability of their supply base, who have responded with little or no investment in genuine innovation, ultimately the only source of real growth. I suspect that some smaller brands may start to reappear as Coles and Woolies seek to differentiate themselves from each other, Aldi, and the alternative distribution channels slowly emerging.
- The big retailers will, or should, start to experiment with some of the technology proving successful in the US and China. The obvious place for such an experiment is in some of the CBD locations they both have. Shoppers looking for a quick shop for dinner as they run for the train home, might value the sort of service offered by Amazon Go and others.
- Managing inventory for suppliers will become even more difficult. Retailers are continuing to reduce their order quantities while increasing the order frequency and placing rigid delivery times on suppliers. This volatility is making supplier demand planning progressively more challenging, while getting paid in a reasonable time means they are funding the retailers. I suspect there will be technical solutions to demand planning evolving that involve AI, interacting in real time with store traffic, weather, and events to deliver a demand number by location. It may be that the DC starts to pack retail shelves, which are delivered on a roll in roll out basis to stores, removing the in-store labour and reducing back store footprint size. At Dairy Farmers 30 years ago, we experimented with this idea for fresh milk, and while it was promising, it did not catch on. Just 30 years too early?
- The physical movement through the supply chains is an increasing problem for supermarkets. Traffic density, and fewer drivers available as the old guard retires, unreplaced by a new driver cohort willing to accept the rigors of driving semis in heavy traffic for 12 hours a day. Combined with the challenge of demand planning, this will increase the number of product out of stock at the retail face, encouraging consumers to alternatives.
No business model remains unchallenged, and can remain unchanged in the face of evolving competitive circumstances. The supermarket business model is no different, although proving to be more resilient than I had thought it would be a decade ago. The core assumption of the business model however remains unchanged. They control a choke point in the supply chain, and take a margin that reflects their power on both sides of that choke point.
Nov 30, 2017 | Change, Marketing, retail, Strategy
Established supermarkets around the world work from a pretty similar, well-honed playbook. The current business model of supermarket retailers is all about scale and leverage applied to their supply chains, and offer of range and price to consumers. While there are...