What SME management should know before investing in chasing government grants

What SME management should know before investing in chasing government grants

 

 

Most SME’s I meet have at one time or another contemplated, and often invested considerable resources in the quest to obtain public grant funds.

Rarely do they approach this exercise with any understanding of the disconnect between the way the commercial world, and the bureaucratic one work. They assume that what to them is normal and obvious is reflected in the bureaucratic processes.

Wrong.

For context, 25 years ago I ran a small grant-funding outfit called Agri Chain Solutions that had been outsourced from the then Department of Forestry, Fisheries and Agriculture at the express direction of the then newly elected Prime Minister Howard.  ACS was a Company, limited by guarantee with a largely commercial, board with two members from the senior ranks of AFFA and Austrade. The chairman had been a very successful MD of a very large business in the food industry. I was recruited as a senior manager with extensive experience in FMCG and agriculture.

Following are some relevant observations from that time about how the bureaucracies operate, which from what I can see, remain accurate.

  • Departmental budgets are set annually in line with the governments policies and priorities. While program budgets are often spread over a number of years, they are reviewed and changed as necessary, or for a hundred other reasons, annually.
  • Departments put in their ‘bids’ in the pre-budget preparation, which includes the costs of running the department, as well as the cost of the programs for which they are arguing.
        • Departmental overheads have been progressively cut over years by shedding heads, which are then contracted back as an ‘off the books’ expenditure, usually netted off against program costs, or just classified as an unavoidable cost overrun.
        • The status of public servants is measured by the number of reports, direct and indirect (i.e., reporting to someone who reports to them) they have, and the size of the budgets they manage. This leads to an ongoing turf war between departments, and sections within departments for status, and public service grades that determine pay and advancement.
  • Public servants are typically held loosely accountable for the expenditure of money compared to the budget allocated. This has absolutely no relationship to the outcome generated by the programs they manage. To my mind, this mismatch of expenditure and accountability is at the core of much of the waste that occurs. It is also the factor that leads to the mad rush to ensure that budgets are all spent before June 30. An underspend will be seen as a sign that a cut is possible, while an overspend is seen as bad luck, with no recriminations, or understanding of the drivers of the overspend.
  • Program reviews done by an ‘outside’ neutral agency are built into the program costs, but neutrality is a joke, as the current PWC fiasco demonstrates. In ACS’s case, the review was done by KPMG, who had to do three revisions to get to a program report AFFA was happy with, in order to get paid. As you might guess, draft 1 was OK by me, draft 2 was nonsense, and draft 3 was total bullshit that bore no relationship to the success, or otherwise of ACS expenditure. I was bitterly and noisily opposed to the final report submitted, but was advised that my disagreement while noted informally, was not relevant. I could not change the world, so I should just get on with life.
  • Grant program budgets allow a percentage of the total program to be held back for ‘Administration’. In the case of ACS, that amount was 20%, a laughable amount, as the total expenditure on all ACS overheads and project management was around 6% of the program budget. All AFFA did was use the withheld amount as a slush fund.
  • Program budgets are broken up to make keeping track easy, bearing no relationship to the way money should be spent to optimise the outcomes. In ACS’s case, we had $9 million over 3 years, minus the withheld admin cost. The department broke the total into 12 equal quarterly amounts and insisted that was the budget. Pointing out that it took 18 months to get good projects up and running, during which time little grant money would be allocated had little effect. In the last 18 months more than the quarterly ‘budget’ amount was to be allocated, which caused great angst in the department. I also pointed out that at the original sunset of 3 years, there would be projects that had not been completed, that ACS and AFFA had a moral if not contractual obligation to see through. After much discussion, we negotiated a 12-month extension for nominated projects that were then shuffled into the follow up program, the National Food Industry Strategy, with a contractor to administer them.
  • Senior public servants speak about accrual accounting as being the base of their accounting processes. ‘Nonsense. It is cash accounting, there are no accruals involved, anywhere.
  • There is a myriad of ‘allowances’ that foster rorting and destroy accountability. I came into contact mostly with those relating to travel. The intent is sensible: make the management simple. However, the effect is to enable officials travelling to rort the system. E.g. A level X official is allowed an amount/day for meals and accommodation, without any paperwork showing expenses incurred. Predictably, they travel as much as possible to places where they have friends and families, claim the whole amount, and pocket the lot, or stay in a cheap hotel, eat as cheaply as possible, and pocket the difference.
  • Finally, for all the babbling about innovation that goes on, it represents the antithesis of the cultural abhorrence bureaucracies have with risk. Innovation is impossible without risk, and risk seen in hindsight is always weaponised as a mistake by those who oppose. As was once said to me by a senior bureaucrat in a well lubricated social setting “my job is to ensure my minister is never seen as stupid, and you know who my minister is, so you know how hard my job is’.

None of this is to denigrate public servants, quite the contrary. As individuals, they are generally a well-educated and potentially powerful force for good, frustrated by the constraints of the culture within which they work. The challenge is changing the culture that has been encouraged to grow around them, a task belonging to those with the power to do so, the politicians.

 

 

Stop investing in dead horses.

Stop investing in dead horses.

 

 

Investing in dead horses sounds like a pretty dumb idea, but it happens all the time.

Projects, ideas, products, people, that have little or no probability of returning revenue and margin from the continuing investment should be stopped. Not only do you save the money and management distraction, but you have the opportunity to leverage the freed-up capacity against the opportunities otherwise passed over.

Opportunity Cost flipped to be just Opportunity.

Over the years I have seen many projects that have persisted long past any reasonable time, never seeming to move forward, but never getting the chop.

When resources have been invested in a project, particularly when it has a favoured place in the psyche of some manager, killing it is often hard, resources just get budgeted, absorbed, and ultimately wasted.

Voltaire observed that: ‘Perfect is the enemy of good’ This leads to the idea of Minimum Viable Product (MVP), getting an idea out to the market in some form to test if it really has sufficient traction to deserve the allocation of resources over alternative uses. ‘Ship and Iterate’ should be the cry, assuming that each time you iterate, you learn from the outcomes, and better understand the commercial reality you confront.

Prudent investors and managers take a ‘portfolio approach’.

They know that not all initiatives are equal. Differences abound in the resources they consume, the opportunity offered, and the odds that the opportunity as visualised will become reality.

Daniel Kahneman established quantitatively that we value what we stand to lose much more than what we stand to gain. This is the magic power of continuing to invest to avoid accepting a sunk cost. Flogging a dead horse by another name.

Stop investing in dead horses, they will not come back to life no matter how hard you wish it were different.

 

 

 

 

Scale or Scope: Australia’s strategic dilemma.

Scale or Scope: Australia’s strategic dilemma.

 

Australia is an economy that has allowed the big to get bigger to such an extent that the barriers to entry in many vital and emerging industries are simply too high for new domestically funded entrants to swallow. This has led to multinationals buying their way into our market, further reducing competition. The latest is the purchase of ASX listed Origin Energy by serial asset accumulator and tax avoider Brookfield. 

We are all used to thinking about economies of scale, the bigger we get, the greater the opportunity to spread the capital cost incurred over a wider base. The obvious example is IT, the costs can be huge, but they scale rapidly downwards as the number of nodes in use increases. It costs less to run each node as you increase numbers than it cost to run the first one.

This ignores the natural increase in transaction costs that used to occur when you scaled, but the use of IT, when done well, radically reduces the friction caused by transaction costs.

When you consider the economics of scope, the same sort of thinking applies, but you seek to leverage the capabilities built in one domain into others. Amazon is the poster child, leveraging the automation of their book selling IT investments into operating the Amazon store, then into Web services, retailing, hardware, and many other products and services.

What has happened is that we have seen the two types of economies of scale and scope give each other a dose of steroids.

Take a step further back, and you see that the expansions of scope are generally coming from adjacent markets that are fragmented, and often regulated.

Fragmented markets naturally coalesce into markets that are increasingly dominated by a few firms. The power of scale in a market overwhelms the fragmentation, and you end up with fewer firms competing, and taken to its logical conclusion, you have an oligopoly. In some cases, oligopolies end up as a monopoly by another name, such as Google in search, Microsoft in office software in the 90’s. They have been ‘defragmented’ by the application of capital that delivers economies of scale.

Then follows the search for scope, the usage situations where capabilities from one market are extended to other markets, at a lesser cost than the adjacent markets could do on their own.

Into this mix you throw regulatory barriers.

The cost of managing compliance is going up and up.

Corporations as they scale apply capital to the management of their compliance, and the wider the scope of activities, the greater leverage they get from that investment.

Look at the fossil fuel companies in Australia. Largely they are multinationals with huge scope and scale, too big for governments to take on. As a result, the increasing returns on the capital employed historically in scale and scope, are now being applied to compliance, particularly tax compliance, as they seek lower tax regimes that insulate returns. The purchase of Origin Energy is a further example of the process.

The strategic policy dilemma for Australia is clear.

For the long-term health and innovative vigour of the economy necessary for us to climb out of the basement in the innovative economy list, there needs to be tough decisions taken that will have a short-term cost, while increasing the odds of a long term benefit. Unfortunately, there are no votes in that equation.

 

 

The referendums failure of basic strategic marketing.

The referendums failure of basic strategic marketing.

 

 

There is a notable omission amongst all the verbiage, finger-pointing, hollow triumphalism, and handwringing emerging after the predicted result of the referendum became a reality.

That omission is the failure of marketing, at least by the ‘Yes’ supporters.

The ‘No’ campaigners did get something right, in the ‘If you don’t know, vote No’ slogan. It was very effective, but was never truly tested in the public arena. It was just left to gather momentum.

Any student of marketing knows that facts and data by themselves struggle to gain and keep the attention of most. If you have ever sat in a presentation where the presenter was reading densely packed PowerPoint slides, you know what I mean, no matter how relevant, intriguing, or important the information being imparted, it fails to be engaging. Telling a story gains the initial attention of an audience, but that attention will be lost in the absence of a connection created by a few facts relevant to that audience. That connection is most powerful when it is both emotional, and quantitative.

Such a combination of the quantitative and personalised qualitative creates empathy that changes minds and generates action.

The ‘No’ campaign had a very good headline, gaining attention, and for many, was enough in the absence of any contrary facts or emotional magnet from the yes campaigners.

The ‘Yes’ campaign failed on both accounts. It did not have a headline, so failed to gain attention, and it did not use any facts to back up the weak and non-personalised emotional connection it set out to make.

At the disposal of the Yes campaign were plenty of facts. They needed to go no further than the statistics articulating the size of ‘the gap’ between education, health, and incarceration rates of first nations people and the general Australian population. What stopped them asking the question if these differences were acceptable to Australians? how would they feel if their child was statistically 14 times more likely to end up in gaol than a white kid, and would die 8 years before the average Australian? They failed to use these emotional doorways at all, at least in my line of sight.

It is easy in hindsight, but the foregoing has been obvious to any serious marketer for a considerable time. The politicians on both sides, and not only the elected ones, allowed the whole ‘debate’ and I use that word cautiously, to become a binary choice. Yes or No, argued in the absence of any basic marketing discipline or strategic thinking.

As an aside, it is my view that the referendum had reasonable odds of being the first in our history to pass despite the lack of bi-partisan political agreement. Australians are in general tolerant of difference. We could not be otherwise, and still be a reasonably successful multicultural and multi-religious nation. Those odds crashed to zero at the recognition that among the Aboriginal leaders, there was not only disagreement, but quite emotional and deeply held disagreement. Those in the electorate who had no strong pre-existing view, or base from which to create one, simply felt that if those who the referendum was about could not agree, who am I to vote for change?

Header photo courtesy SMH

Australia’s ‘KAP-Gap’ will kill us!

Australia’s ‘KAP-Gap’ will kill us!

 

Australia has a problem, a big one. Our KAP Gap is huge and becoming ‘huger’ by the month.

Knowledge-Attitudes-Practise gap is the difference between what people say they will do, and what they actually do.

At some level, we understand what needs to be done, but are so cemented into the good life that we cannot see our way to absorb the pain necessary if our grandchildren are to continue to enjoy the fruits of this country.

How do Australians respond to the reality of the latest Harvard Complexity report which records a slip from 60th in 2000, to 93rd in 2021? Being sandwiched between the manufacturing goliaths of Uganda and Pakistan is hardly a point of pride. (Perhaps we are getting used to it, given the slip of Australian rugby from the top tier to a nation ranged with the minnows of world rugby, but that is another post)

There is a notable reluctance to embrace change. Inevitably, change makes some uncomfortable, so we substitute a fuzzy slogan. There needs to be meat on the bones of an effective slogan that resonates on a deeply personal level, or it remains just fuzzy words. This applies equally to big changes as it does to the little ones we are asked to make every day, it is just that the latter are rarely seen and measured.

How is it that we are still seen as a wealthy nation?

I have an acquaintance who is wealthy, always has been, but he is a lazy sod, pretending to work, being involved in stuff that amuses him. Luckily for him, his father and grandfather were of a different sort. They accumulated wealth from hard work, taking risks, and learning from their mistakes. My acquaintance is wealthy because he is lucky in his parentage, just as Australia is lucky in its abundance of stuff we can dig up and flog that the rest of the world wants.

Little of that nasty four letter word ‘Work’ involved.

Tomorrow, as this is written, there will be a referendum. Irrespective of the view you hold, and the way you will vote, it is hard to argue that the policy choices, and their implementation has not been at an acceptable level to date. You only need to look at the ‘Gap’ between first Australian incarceration rates, suicides, domestic violence, education, and others to come to that conclusion. What this vote will have articulated is the willingness of the Australian population to accept that change is necessary. It may not always be good for everyone, and indeed, will never receive complete agreement of the detail. However, if we reject all change, we also reject all opportunity, which is rarely a good strategy.