Oct 31, 2023 | Change, Marketing, Strategy
When I was a boy in this business, back in the seventies, having a brand was table stakes to be in the game. At that time, there were a number of supermarket chains, and every one was stocked with a suppliers proprietary branded product.
There were many types and scale of brands. From the small producers hoping for a modest segment in the market that would provide a living and employment in their modest factories, to the multi-national, mass market giants. There were no ‘House brands’, until Franklins as an experiment ranged ‘No Frills’ margarine, packed by my then employer Vegetable Oils Ltd, which later became Meadow Lea foods.
Over time, the number of supermarkets reduced to the two gorillas and Aldi that we have today, and the number of brands reduced from the many hundreds down to the few MNC brands, with a very few exceptions, which are slowly being squeezed of life today.
If the trends of those 40 years continue, a brand extinction event is getting closer every day.
The latest victim is Sara Lee.
Originally the brand came from the US, and at its height had diversified into a wide range of products from the initial frozen cakes to clothing, and real estate. The Australian business has been through several owners, the most recent being a Dutch company nobody outside the industry would have heard of.
Manufacturers have been their own worst enemies.
They have failed to recognise the long-term impact on their profitability of the increasing power of Woolies and Coles, with the recent addition of Aldi. Retailers do not care about proprietary brands; their goal is their own profitability. If they cannot have your product on shelf, they are just as happy to have an alternative.
Increasingly over the past 30 years that alternative has been a house brand.
When retailers own the shelf space from which consumers pick products, and also ‘own’ the sales margins from half the products for sale, guess who wins. Retailers have used their muscle to squeeze out proprietary brands, taking the proprietary margin for themselves. The stupidity is that manufacturers have aided and abetted this quest to destroy them, by supplying the products and stopping the long-term brand building that made them successful. The funds have been redirected by manufacturers from advertising and brand building back into price promotion. Selling with price being the only differentiator is a sure way to destroy a brand.
To explain the resilience of a few brands, and some that resisted the retailer pressure for years before succumbing, you need look no further than effective, long term brand building advertising. The Vegemite jingle is in the brains of most Australians over 40, and Vegemite persists. Aeroplane jelly is also there, and I would guess the brand could be rejuvenated by a return. Similarly, Meadow Lea is a shadow of its former self, but 30 years after the great ‘you ought to be congratulated’ advertising finished, the positioning of Meadow Lea remains viable, and could be revived with investment.
To explain the failure of FMCG management to continue to invest in their proprietary brands over the years, allowing house brands to take over, you need look no further than the lack of understanding of the contrary dynamics at work.
Advertising is a long term investment, over numbers of years. Advertising is treated as an expense, one that is accounted for on an annual basis in the accounts of businesses. These two contrary forces, when allied to executive KPI’s dominated by accounting thinking, and the increasing power of the retailers to demand discounts as a necessity for distribution has drained the capital necessary for brand investment. The retailers are happy, they have the margin. The short term executive profitability goals of a few executives may be reached, so they are happy individuals. However, the brands have been destroyed, and the long term viability of their manufacturing operations been compromised, in most cases, terminally.
That in a nutshell, leaving aside questions of the operational efficiency of the Sara Lee business, is why it is now on the discount block itself.
Oct 27, 2023 | Collaboration, Communication
Throughout human evolution, we have existed in small groups, tribes and clans. Individuals have worked together for the common good of the small tribe, and often, perhaps most often, been at odds with the tribe across the river.
British anthropologist Robin Dunbar introduced his theory that humans can maintain stable social relationships with no more than 150 people. This is a theory now so well accepted that ‘Dunbar’s number‘ has almost become a cliché.
The phrase ‘Stable Social Relationships’ has particular relevance in the age of social media platforms. How many friends do you have on Facebook, connections on LinkedIn, followers on Instagram?? For many, it is way beyond 150.
Question: How do you maintain ‘Stable Social Relationships’ with that number of people?
Answer: You cannot.
Social media gets the blame for all sorts of things, rightly so, but it is not the fault of the platforms, it is the fault of evolution.
Our application of technology has run well ahead of our evolutionally capacity to manage it and retain the relationships that made us the most successful species ever.
It seems to me that the growth of private messaging, reversion to personalised even handwritten notes, and emotional engagement of ‘Local’ things is a response to the ‘platformisation’ of our social relationships.
I think it is a trend that will continue and grow.
Now we have the relative unknown of AI coming at us like a train, changing again the basis on which we interact.
Dr Dunbar has little advice on that score.
I wonder if ‘friends’ will ever include Robbie the Robot?
Oct 24, 2023 | Governance, Management, Small business
Most SME’s I meet have at one time or another contemplated, and often invested considerable resources in the quest to obtain public grant funds.
Rarely do they approach this exercise with any understanding of the disconnect between the way the commercial world, and the bureaucratic one work. They assume that what to them is normal and obvious is reflected in the bureaucratic processes.
Wrong.
For context, 25 years ago I ran a small grant-funding outfit called Agri Chain Solutions that had been outsourced from the then Department of Forestry, Fisheries and Agriculture at the express direction of the then newly elected Prime Minister Howard. ACS was a Company, limited by guarantee with a largely commercial, board with two members from the senior ranks of AFFA and Austrade. The chairman had been a very successful MD of a very large business in the food industry. I was recruited as a senior manager with extensive experience in FMCG and agriculture.
Following are some relevant observations from that time about how the bureaucracies operate, which from what I can see, remain accurate.
- Departmental budgets are set annually in line with the governments policies and priorities. While program budgets are often spread over a number of years, they are reviewed and changed as necessary, or for a hundred other reasons, annually.
- Departments put in their ‘bids’ in the pre-budget preparation, which includes the costs of running the department, as well as the cost of the programs for which they are arguing.
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- Departmental overheads have been progressively cut over years by shedding heads, which are then contracted back as an ‘off the books’ expenditure, usually netted off against program costs, or just classified as an unavoidable cost overrun.
- The status of public servants is measured by the number of reports, direct and indirect (i.e., reporting to someone who reports to them) they have, and the size of the budgets they manage. This leads to an ongoing turf war between departments, and sections within departments for status, and public service grades that determine pay and advancement.
- Public servants are typically held loosely accountable for the expenditure of money compared to the budget allocated. This has absolutely no relationship to the outcome generated by the programs they manage. To my mind, this mismatch of expenditure and accountability is at the core of much of the waste that occurs. It is also the factor that leads to the mad rush to ensure that budgets are all spent before June 30. An underspend will be seen as a sign that a cut is possible, while an overspend is seen as bad luck, with no recriminations, or understanding of the drivers of the overspend.
- Program reviews done by an ‘outside’ neutral agency are built into the program costs, but neutrality is a joke, as the current PWC fiasco demonstrates. In ACS’s case, the review was done by KPMG, who had to do three revisions to get to a program report AFFA was happy with, in order to get paid. As you might guess, draft 1 was OK by me, draft 2 was nonsense, and draft 3 was total bullshit that bore no relationship to the success, or otherwise of ACS expenditure. I was bitterly and noisily opposed to the final report submitted, but was advised that my disagreement while noted informally, was not relevant. I could not change the world, so I should just get on with life.
- Grant program budgets allow a percentage of the total program to be held back for ‘Administration’. In the case of ACS, that amount was 20%, a laughable amount, as the total expenditure on all ACS overheads and project management was around 6% of the program budget. All AFFA did was use the withheld amount as a slush fund.
- Program budgets are broken up to make keeping track easy, bearing no relationship to the way money should be spent to optimise the outcomes. In ACS’s case, we had $9 million over 3 years, minus the withheld admin cost. The department broke the total into 12 equal quarterly amounts and insisted that was the budget. Pointing out that it took 18 months to get good projects up and running, during which time little grant money would be allocated had little effect. In the last 18 months more than the quarterly ‘budget’ amount was to be allocated, which caused great angst in the department. I also pointed out that at the original sunset of 3 years, there would be projects that had not been completed, that ACS and AFFA had a moral if not contractual obligation to see through. After much discussion, we negotiated a 12-month extension for nominated projects that were then shuffled into the follow up program, the National Food Industry Strategy, with a contractor to administer them.
- Senior public servants speak about accrual accounting as being the base of their accounting processes. ‘Nonsense. It is cash accounting, there are no accruals involved, anywhere.
- There is a myriad of ‘allowances’ that foster rorting and destroy accountability. I came into contact mostly with those relating to travel. The intent is sensible: make the management simple. However, the effect is to enable officials travelling to rort the system. E.g. A level X official is allowed an amount/day for meals and accommodation, without any paperwork showing expenses incurred. Predictably, they travel as much as possible to places where they have friends and families, claim the whole amount, and pocket the lot, or stay in a cheap hotel, eat as cheaply as possible, and pocket the difference.
- Finally, for all the babbling about innovation that goes on, it represents the antithesis of the cultural abhorrence bureaucracies have with risk. Innovation is impossible without risk, and risk seen in hindsight is always weaponised as a mistake by those who oppose. As was once said to me by a senior bureaucrat in a well lubricated social setting “my job is to ensure my minister is never seen as stupid, and you know who my minister is, so you know how hard my job is’.
None of this is to denigrate public servants, quite the contrary. As individuals, they are generally a well-educated and potentially powerful force for good, frustrated by the constraints of the culture within which they work. The challenge is changing the culture that has been encouraged to grow around them, a task belonging to those with the power to do so, the politicians.
Oct 20, 2023 | Innovation, Management
Investing in dead horses sounds like a pretty dumb idea, but it happens all the time.
Projects, ideas, products, people, that have little or no probability of returning revenue and margin from the continuing investment should be stopped. Not only do you save the money and management distraction, but you have the opportunity to leverage the freed-up capacity against the opportunities otherwise passed over.
Opportunity Cost flipped to be just Opportunity.
Over the years I have seen many projects that have persisted long past any reasonable time, never seeming to move forward, but never getting the chop.
When resources have been invested in a project, particularly when it has a favoured place in the psyche of some manager, killing it is often hard, resources just get budgeted, absorbed, and ultimately wasted.
Voltaire observed that: ‘Perfect is the enemy of good’ This leads to the idea of Minimum Viable Product (MVP), getting an idea out to the market in some form to test if it really has sufficient traction to deserve the allocation of resources over alternative uses. ‘Ship and Iterate’ should be the cry, assuming that each time you iterate, you learn from the outcomes, and better understand the commercial reality you confront.
Prudent investors and managers take a ‘portfolio approach’.
They know that not all initiatives are equal. Differences abound in the resources they consume, the opportunity offered, and the odds that the opportunity as visualised will become reality.
Daniel Kahneman established quantitatively that we value what we stand to lose much more than what we stand to gain. This is the magic power of continuing to invest to avoid accepting a sunk cost. Flogging a dead horse by another name.
Stop investing in dead horses, they will not come back to life no matter how hard you wish it were different.
Oct 18, 2023 | Governance, Strategy
Australia is an economy that has allowed the big to get bigger to such an extent that the barriers to entry in many vital and emerging industries are simply too high for new domestically funded entrants to swallow. This has led to multinationals buying their way into our market, further reducing competition. The latest is the purchase of ASX listed Origin Energy by serial asset accumulator and tax avoider Brookfield.
We are all used to thinking about economies of scale, the bigger we get, the greater the opportunity to spread the capital cost incurred over a wider base. The obvious example is IT, the costs can be huge, but they scale rapidly downwards as the number of nodes in use increases. It costs less to run each node as you increase numbers than it cost to run the first one.
This ignores the natural increase in transaction costs that used to occur when you scaled, but the use of IT, when done well, radically reduces the friction caused by transaction costs.
When you consider the economics of scope, the same sort of thinking applies, but you seek to leverage the capabilities built in one domain into others. Amazon is the poster child, leveraging the automation of their book selling IT investments into operating the Amazon store, then into Web services, retailing, hardware, and many other products and services.
What has happened is that we have seen the two types of economies of scale and scope give each other a dose of steroids.
Take a step further back, and you see that the expansions of scope are generally coming from adjacent markets that are fragmented, and often regulated.
Fragmented markets naturally coalesce into markets that are increasingly dominated by a few firms. The power of scale in a market overwhelms the fragmentation, and you end up with fewer firms competing, and taken to its logical conclusion, you have an oligopoly. In some cases, oligopolies end up as a monopoly by another name, such as Google in search, Microsoft in office software in the 90’s. They have been ‘defragmented’ by the application of capital that delivers economies of scale.
Then follows the search for scope, the usage situations where capabilities from one market are extended to other markets, at a lesser cost than the adjacent markets could do on their own.
Into this mix you throw regulatory barriers.
The cost of managing compliance is going up and up.
Corporations as they scale apply capital to the management of their compliance, and the wider the scope of activities, the greater leverage they get from that investment.
Look at the fossil fuel companies in Australia. Largely they are multinationals with huge scope and scale, too big for governments to take on. As a result, the increasing returns on the capital employed historically in scale and scope, are now being applied to compliance, particularly tax compliance, as they seek lower tax regimes that insulate returns. The purchase of Origin Energy is a further example of the process.
The strategic policy dilemma for Australia is clear.
For the long-term health and innovative vigour of the economy necessary for us to climb out of the basement in the innovative economy list, there needs to be tough decisions taken that will have a short-term cost, while increasing the odds of a long term benefit. Unfortunately, there are no votes in that equation.
