Jul 5, 2024 | Change, Governance, retail
The undertaking by Opposition leader Dutton, supported by the Nationals leader Littleproud, to break up the retail gorillas Woolworths and Coles is absurd. It is a gross example of stupid, short term populism and fear mongering that exhibit either utter ignorance of the current and proposed laws, how the supermarket supply chains work, or scary levels of ignorance.
Perhaps it is all of these mixed up in a broth of complete ‘short-termism’.
It seems to me that facts and long-term benefit to the economy and communities play no role in this ill-conceived appeal to populist, thoughtless ‘policy’.
Such a breakup is far more likely to increase retail prices to consumers, it will certainly not result in any reduction.
Let me be clear about the failures of this proposal, at least as I see them.
Supply chain mechanics.
- The current voluntary code of practice, and the proposed mandatory standards relate to the chains and their suppliers. In a minority of cases are these suppliers also the manufacturers of the consumer product, as well as being the farmer, and all the associated and necessary middlemen that provide the supply chain with the ‘Oil’ that makes it work. Therefore, the policy if implemented would do nothing for the small scale ‘farmers’ who are often held up as victims of retailer power.
- Scale breeds scale. Suppliers of fruit and veg have over time, built scale to squeeze out transaction costs from the supply chain. The Australian Fresh Produce Alliance is a small group of very large ‘consolidators’ that between them control roughly half the $9 billion fresh fruit and vegetable market. These businesses are farmers only in the sense that they might own, contract, or represent hundreds of individual farming locations. Several of the major players are owned overseas. A breakup of Coles and Woollies would only encourage them to increase prices, as the suppliers would then have greater scale than the chains, and would use it.
- The small, independent farmers of commodity fruit and veg is a part of the past. Believing otherwise is fantasy. Where those who choose to farm a small holding have opportunities are in specialty produce sold through channels other than chain retailers.
Legal considerations.
- Any breakup would involve legal action, probably to the high court. I doubt the retailers would take a breakup order as anything other than an order to self-destruct. This would be resisted fiercely.
- The mandatory Code recommended by Dr Emerson, and widely accepted is only marginally more useful than the current voluntary code. It still requires that suppliers lodge complaints. Whilst there are now to be penalties applicable by arbitration, the likelihood of complaints remains low, despite the ‘protections’ articulated in recommendations 3, 4 and 5.
- The scale of penalties proposed by Dr Emerson is absurd. If the threat of implementation was real, nobody in their right mind would invest in retail of any scale. Imposition of the maximum penalty would send the retailer concerned broke. Assuming they are just ‘regulatory scarecrows’ with little legally independent investigation and enforcement power, they represent little of any real deterrent value, while adding friction to the supply chain. Friction generates costs, which will be recovered from consumers.
Competition falsehood.
- Coles and Woolworths do currently have somewhere around 65% market share of retail FMCG sales. That percentage is being eroded by Aldi, as it opens more stores and successfully takes market share.
- In regional areas of NSW and Vic particularly, but also SA and WA, there are a number of strong independent retailers. Drakes, Ritchie’s, IGA, and others are all competing successfully against Coles and Woollies. None would be able to buy disassembled bits of the gorillas, and even if they were, what would that do to the objective of decreasing retail prices? It would more likely put upward pressure on prices as the purchaser sought a return on the investment.
- It you were to breakup either of the retail gorillas, who is a likely buyer? I cannot think of any, except perhaps Walmart, who are also smart enough to assess the sovereign risk as being considerable, so they would not put anything like the expected value of the broken up businesses on the table.
- Some time ago, under Graham Samuel, the ACCC forced the removal of contractual exclusivity of Coles and Woollies in shopping centres under Section 47 of the Competition and Consumer act 2010. That move was a very sensible one, and has resulted in Aldi opening a number of stores in shopping centres in opposition to Coles and Woollies. (An extension to cover ‘land-banking’ might be a useful consideration.)
- While Coles and Woolworths are immensely powerful, they are far from the only distribution channel that exists. In a court they would point out the multibillion dollar and still fragmented food service channel, as well as the independent specialist retailers who continue to provide opportunities for small scale farming.
A final thought. Every Australian with a superannuation fund: i.e. most of us, would have Woollies and Coles in their portfolio, knowingly or otherwise. These shares have been good investments in terms of capital gain, and throw decent tax effective dividends. A breakup would threaten those investments.
For the Opposition leader to propose legislation, should they be elected to government, to break up Woolworths and Coles is nothing but an idiotic, populist, ill-considered appeal to voters without the knowledge to dismiss it with the contempt it deserves.
It is also an astonishing dismissal of one of the cores of the conservative parties: to limit the intervention of government in the workings of the economy.
We Australians deserve better from our ‘leaders’ than opportunistic and destructive policy statements.
Jul 2, 2024 | AI, Change, Strategy
AI is the latest new shiny thing in everybody’s sightline.
It seems to me that AI has two faces, a bit like the Roman God Janus.
On one hand we have the large language models or Generatively Pre-trained Transformers, and on the other we have the tools that can be built by just about anyone to do a specific task, or range of tasks, using the GPT’s.
The former requires huge ongoing capital investments in the technology, and infrastructure necessary for operations. There are only a few companies in the position to make those investments: Microsoft, Amazon, Meta, Apple, and perhaps a few others should they choose to do so. (in former days, Governments might consider investing in such fundamental infrastructure, as they did in roads, power generation, water infrastructure)
At the other end of the scale are the tools which anybody could build using the technology provided by the owners of the core technology and infrastructure.
These are entirely different.
Imagine if Thomas Edison and Nikola Tesla between them had managed to be the only ones in a position to generate electricity. They sold that energy to anybody who had a use for it from powering factories, to powering the Internet, to home appliances.
That is the situation we now have with those few who own access to the technology and anybody else who chooses to build on top of it.
The business models that enabled both to grow and prosper are as yet unclear, but becoming clearer every day.
For example, Apple has spent billions developing the technology behind Siri and Vision Pro, neither of which has evolved into a winning position. In early June (2024) Apple and OpenAI did a deal to incorporate ChatGPT into the Apple operating system.
It is a strategic master stroke.
Apple will build a giant toll booth into the hyper-loyal and generally cashed up user base of Apple. Going one step further, they have branded it ‘Apple Intelligence’. In effect, they have created an ‘AI house-brand.’ Others commit to the investment, and Apple charges for access to their user base, with almost no marginal cost.
Down the track, Apple will conduct an auction amongst the few suppliers of AI technology and infrastructure for that access to their user base. To wrangle an old metaphor, they stopped digging for gold, and started selling shovels.
Masterstroke.
It means they can move their focus from the core GPT technology, to providing elegant tools to users of the Apple ecosystem, and charge for the access.
What will be important in the future is not just the foundation technology, which will be in a few hands, but the task specific tools that are built on top of the technology, leveraging its power.
Jun 28, 2024 | Leadership
Performance is always enhanced when there is skin in the game.
I only work with SME’s, for the very simple reason that those in charge have skin in the game. The process of creating the environment where significant improvement to financial operational and strategic performance can be achieved requires change, and change is hard. When you own the business, and you decide that change is necessary to achieve the goals, you can drive those changes, and most people will follow. In a large business, most of the senior management still get paid, even when the train goes off the rails. They may lose a bonus here and there, but usually not, as they set the rules themselves.
It is a situation I dislike.
In the case of marketing, the lack of accountability for outcomes is more pronounced than in other functions. There is a mystique, a black box, and marketers have convinced themselves, and others that success is about long-term brand building, therefore they cannot be held accountable for results today.
Nonsense.
Marketing should be accountable for margins, absolute and percentages, today and tomorrow. Then they have some skin in the game and will act accordingly.
The upside of the greater accountability is that those in the corner office will take them more seriously than they have in the past.
The turnover of senior marketing personnel is faster than any other function. CEO’s are usually accountants, lawyers or engineers, and they quickly get sick of marketers talking in cliches, making vague promises, then delivering creative excuses when the outcomes fail to materialise.
Accept accountably for revenue and margins, and that uncertainty goes away.
As Steve Jobs put it, you need to ‘own the results‘.
Header credit: NZ Herald State of origin 2,.2024
Jun 24, 2024 | AI, Change
We’re all familiar with the standard XY graph. It shows us a point on 2 dimensions.
AI does a similar thing except that it has millions, and more recently, trillions, of dimensions.
Those dimensions are defined by the words we write into the instructions, built upon the base of raw data to which the machine has access.
The output from AI is a function of the data that the particular AI tool has been ‘trained’ on and accesses to respond to the instructions given.
Every letter, word, and sentence, generated is a probability estimate given what has been said previously in the database of what the next word, sentence, paragraph, chapter, and so on, will be.
Generative pre-training of digital models goes back into the 1990’s. Usually it was just called ‘machine learning’, which plays down the ability of machines to identify patterns in data and generate further data-points that fit those patterns. The revolution came with the word ‘transformer’, the T in ChatGPT. This came from the seminal AI paper written inside Google in 2017 called ‘Attention is all you need’.
The simple way to think about a transformer, is to imagine a digital version of a neural network similar to the one that drives our brains. We make connections, based on the combination of what we see, hear, and read, with our own domain knowledge history and attitudes acting as guardrails. A machine simulates that by its access to all the data it has been ‘trained on’, and applies the instructions we give it to then assemble from the data the best answer to the question asked.
The very first paper on AI was written by Alan Turing in 1950 was entitled ‘Computing machinery and intelligence’. He speculated on the possibility of creating machines that think, introducing the concept of what is now known as the ‘Turing Test.’
The original idea that drove the development of the transformer model by Google was a desire to build a superior search capability. When that was achieved, suddenly the other capabilities became evident.
Google then started thinking about the ramifications of releasing the tool, and hesitated, while Microsoft who had been also investing heavily through OpenAI, which started as a non-profit, beat them to a release date, forcing Google to follow quickly, stumbling along the way.
Since the release of ChatGPT3 on November 20, 2022, AI has become an avalanche of tools rapidly expanding to change the way we think about work, education, and the future.
Header cartoon credit: Tom Gauld in New Scientist.
Jun 19, 2024 | Change, Governance, Leadership
Many years ago, I worked for Dairy Farmers Ltd. It was a large dairy co-operative operating in the dying days of milk regulation in NSW. The business had two divisions, reporting at EBIT. The first and biggest by a very large margin was the regulated milk business.
All milk produced in NSW at that time was by regulation vested in a statutory authority, which then ‘sold’ the milk to processors to be processed and distributed as fresh milk. It was a highly regulated and price-controlled industry from the cow to the consumers fridge.
Milk in excess of the requirements for fresh milk was termed ‘manufacturing’ milk. The farmers were paid directly by processors at a market rate.
At the time, the price paid by the diary corporation for fresh milk was roughly 2.2 times the price the co-operative paid for manufacturing milk by the second division, the Dairy Foods division that produced all dairy products beyond fresh milk.
Manufacturing milk was unregulated in any way beyond food safety.
The commercial imperative for the dairy farmers was clear, albeit not viable long term.
After 8 years of struggle, the Dairy Foods division had recovered from being a commercial basket case, one step from the corporate mortician to a significant and profitable player in the national market. The culture that supported that huge improvement was highly competitive, productivity focused, and financially disciplined. By contrast the milk division was a cost-plus business operating as a regulated monopoly, and so had become fat and lazy.
A newly arrived Managing Director decided to merge the two divisions. His reason, supported by a report by a highly paid consultant, was that the commercial culture of the dairy foods division was needed to be patched onto the milk division, facing the reality of deregulation at some point.
As a newly appointed GM of the dairy foods division after those 8 long years of struggle, I resisted this change as strongly as I knew how. I argued that culture could not be ‘copied and pasted’ from one organisation to another, even those working under a common ownership and centralised head office structure that allocated capital. It seemed to me that the much larger still regulated business would reject the completely different culture of the smaller unit, which would in turn erode the competitive culture of the dairy foods division they were trying to spread.
That is what happened, resulting in Dairy farmers becoming another sovereign corporate casualty.
- Processes that ordered, allocated and paid for milk for the regulated fresh market dominated the cash flow of the merged divisions. The Dairy Foods division cash flow processes and management became lost in the quagmire of the regulated cash flow of the much larger former milk division. Focus and discipline went out the window.
- The board of the business, was made up of farmers with 2 exceptions, the chairman and MD. The rest of the board were dairy farmers who unanimously rejected the notion of deregulation. It was clearly in their short-term financial interests to retain the existing regulated system. There was simply no formal recognition that the regulated system was an economic basket case. Privately, several of the board members did recognise that fact, but the power of the status quo prevailed formally.
- Major customers, the supermarket retailers were able to bring significant pressure onto trading terms given the previously completely separated divisions were now one. This pressure seemed to me to be a catalyst that brought forward the date of deregulation. The retailers started to bring fresh milk across the border from deregulated Victoria, and discounting in NSW in defiance of the state regulations, citing Section 92 of the Australian constitution, which bans constraints on interstate trade.
- The financial discipline beyond managing cash flow exercised by the former Dairy Foods division was lost as the reporting was merged. It was further complicated as Dairy Farmers set about ‘merging’ (Co-Operative speak for taking over) other Co-ops in NSW, QLD and SA. These co-ops were all different, but all were afflicted by lack of commercial and competitive focus on customers and consumers.
All of these point to the fact that culture is organic, and like all organic systems requires time, investment, alignment across the broad stakeholder population, and nurturing.
What should have happened but did not.
- There was no attention paid to the differing cultures that existed. Little useful thought was given to the practical challenges of merging them. The merger came via announcement, and a revision of the organisation chart. The two were simply incompatible. While a sensible review would have highlighted that fact, it was ignored.
- There was no integration plan that ranged from the strategic to the tactical and operational. Again, it was driven by the revised organisation chart, with little effort made to successfully articulate the reasons for the merger to anyone, including senior management.
- Any attempt to articulate a ‘vision’ for the merged entity was missing in action. The justification was all about the imagined financial benefits that would flow, and the risk mitigation coming from the probable deregulation of the fresh milk business at some future point. Both were reasonable expectations, but there was no thought about how to turn reasonable expectations into cash. Somehow, by some unknown osmotic process, it was supposed to just happen.
- There were no objectives for the integration that reflected the strengths of both, the holes that needed filling, and the resources necessary to achieve the restructured strategic objectives.
- There were no financial or operational objectives beyond budgets generated by spreadsheet aiming at an EBIT that was by decree, rather than by any disciplined process. The budgets of the two separate divisions were just merged, with the mythical improvement index applied.
- There was always going to be considerable resistance from both sides of the merger. Almost universally, (most certainly by me) the merger was seen as a retrograde step, ignoring the very different challenges faced by the two entities.
The great irony I see from the perspective of 30 years, is that Bega Co-operative virtually broke on the back of cheese factory expansion that had run significantly over budget, was saved by a cash injection by Dairy Farmers. Bega has since evolved into a major producer of branded packaged goods to supermarkets. Dairy Farmers has disappeared as a commercial entity.
The lesson: Cultural change is complex, messy, and potentially terminal in the absence of skilled leadership, complete transparency, and what at the time would seem to be significant over-communication.
Header cartoon credit: www.Gapingvoid.com
