Jul 17, 2024 | retail, Strategy
The pile-on to Coles and Woolworths as protagonists in the ‘cost of living crisis’ and accusations of gouging, is somewhat akin to the ‘burning of witches’ in Salem in 1692. (in fact, most of the 16 executed were hanged, but never let a good story get in the way of a fact). The population just needs a victim to blame for their poor fortune, anyone will do, never mind their lack of guilt.
If there was any guilt involved in the lead up to the current ‘crisis’ it would have been allayed by a factual examination of the supply chains in use by retailers, and the drivers of those chains.
It is true that Coles and Woolworths are amongst the most financially successful retailers in the world. This is a position evolved from a long history of take-overs and mergers in the supermarket industry, endorsed by those with the power to stop them. Coles and Woolworths have by this process, as well as their own efforts to attract and keep consumers, have accumulated the scale that enables them to deliver superior returns their shareholders, a group that includes every Australian with superannuation. Had they not performed in this way, the boards of these businesses would have relieved be MD’s of their role. On occasions over the last 40 years I have been watching, there have been a number of MD’s so sent on gardening duty.
So, where should the blame be laid, if there is to be any laid?
None of the various reports have laid bare the mechanics of the supply chains at work. At best they refer to them in passing. However, the antidote to the unreasonable exercising of power back through a supply chain, which is the hypothesis of all the proponents of the gouging story, is transparency.
It is true that Coles and Woolworths can be brutal with their suppliers. Not every supplier is treated equally, and dumb, insensitive, and even discriminatory choices are made, but that situation exists in every walk of life. You do not address these shortcomings by regulation, you address them with transparency.
I used the two dimensional scale in the header to score Coles and Woolworths based on my experiences over 45 years. Despite the current voluntary code of conduct, seemingly about to be made mandatory, the transparency scores for both retailers are concentrated on the bottom left of the scale.
The first three ‘transparency milestones’ get a tick, as 1 or 2 out of five. They are present but only to ensure some level of quality and to protect the retailers from litigation.
The ‘supply chain scope’ measures for both give solid scores in the internal operations, a pass for direct suppliers, but nothing beyond a passing interest in the final two.
Divestiture will not change any of that. It would simply add cost to the supply chains previously wrung out by scale.
A break-up requires a party willing and able to stump up the capital to complete a transaction. To generate a return on that investment it would be necessary to rise prices to accommodate the increased costs. It is unlikely any domestic group would be a buyer, which just leaves an international chain being handed a stepping stone, which is equally unlikely to reduce process in any way.
If the authorities were really interested in adjusting the profitability of the retailers in favour of their suppliers, who have been scrambling for scale for as long as the retailers have, they need to throw the divestiture story into the bin marked ‘stupid idea’ and consider mechanisms that address the core of the problem: measures that favour those with capital at the expense of those who do not.
Divestiture makes a good headline in populist press, but like many good headlines, has absolutely no substance.
Header: courtesy of HBR ‘How transparent is your supply chain ‘ August 2019 Bateman & Bonanni
Jul 5, 2024 | Change, Governance, retail
The undertaking by Opposition leader Dutton, supported by the Nationals leader Littleproud, to break up the retail gorillas Woolworths and Coles is absurd. It is a gross example of stupid, short term populism and fear mongering that exhibit either utter ignorance of the current and proposed laws, how the supermarket supply chains work, or scary levels of ignorance.
Perhaps it is all of these mixed up in a broth of complete ‘short-termism’.
It seems to me that facts and long-term benefit to the economy and communities play no role in this ill-conceived appeal to populist, thoughtless ‘policy’.
Such a breakup is far more likely to increase retail prices to consumers, it will certainly not result in any reduction.
Let me be clear about the failures of this proposal, at least as I see them.
Supply chain mechanics.
- The current voluntary code of practice, and the proposed mandatory standards relate to the chains and their suppliers. In a minority of cases are these suppliers also the manufacturers of the consumer product, as well as being the farmer, and all the associated and necessary middlemen that provide the supply chain with the ‘Oil’ that makes it work. Therefore, the policy if implemented would do nothing for the small scale ‘farmers’ who are often held up as victims of retailer power.
- Scale breeds scale. Suppliers of fruit and veg have over time, built scale to squeeze out transaction costs from the supply chain. The Australian Fresh Produce Alliance is a small group of very large ‘consolidators’ that between them control roughly half the $9 billion fresh fruit and vegetable market. These businesses are farmers only in the sense that they might own, contract, or represent hundreds of individual farming locations. Several of the major players are owned overseas. A breakup of Coles and Woollies would only encourage them to increase prices, as the suppliers would then have greater scale than the chains, and would use it.
- The small, independent farmers of commodity fruit and veg is a part of the past. Believing otherwise is fantasy. Where those who choose to farm a small holding have opportunities are in specialty produce sold through channels other than chain retailers.
Legal considerations.
- Any breakup would involve legal action, probably to the high court. I doubt the retailers would take a breakup order as anything other than an order to self-destruct. This would be resisted fiercely.
- The mandatory Code recommended by Dr Emerson, and widely accepted is only marginally more useful than the current voluntary code. It still requires that suppliers lodge complaints. Whilst there are now to be penalties applicable by arbitration, the likelihood of complaints remains low, despite the ‘protections’ articulated in recommendations 3, 4 and 5.
- The scale of penalties proposed by Dr Emerson is absurd. If the threat of implementation was real, nobody in their right mind would invest in retail of any scale. Imposition of the maximum penalty would send the retailer concerned broke. Assuming they are just ‘regulatory scarecrows’ with little legally independent investigation and enforcement power, they represent little of any real deterrent value, while adding friction to the supply chain. Friction generates costs, which will be recovered from consumers.
Competition falsehood.
- Coles and Woolworths do currently have somewhere around 65% market share of retail FMCG sales. That percentage is being eroded by Aldi, as it opens more stores and successfully takes market share.
- In regional areas of NSW and Vic particularly, but also SA and WA, there are a number of strong independent retailers. Drakes, Ritchie’s, IGA, and others are all competing successfully against Coles and Woollies. None would be able to buy disassembled bits of the gorillas, and even if they were, what would that do to the objective of decreasing retail prices? It would more likely put upward pressure on prices as the purchaser sought a return on the investment.
- It you were to breakup either of the retail gorillas, who is a likely buyer? I cannot think of any, except perhaps Walmart, who are also smart enough to assess the sovereign risk as being considerable, so they would not put anything like the expected value of the broken up businesses on the table.
- Some time ago, under Graham Samuel, the ACCC forced the removal of contractual exclusivity of Coles and Woollies in shopping centres under Section 47 of the Competition and Consumer act 2010. That move was a very sensible one, and has resulted in Aldi opening a number of stores in shopping centres in opposition to Coles and Woollies. (An extension to cover ‘land-banking’ might be a useful consideration.)
- While Coles and Woolworths are immensely powerful, they are far from the only distribution channel that exists. In a court they would point out the multibillion dollar and still fragmented food service channel, as well as the independent specialist retailers who continue to provide opportunities for small scale farming.
A final thought. Every Australian with a superannuation fund: i.e. most of us, would have Woollies and Coles in their portfolio, knowingly or otherwise. These shares have been good investments in terms of capital gain, and throw decent tax effective dividends. A breakup would threaten those investments.
For the Opposition leader to propose legislation, should they be elected to government, to break up Woolworths and Coles is nothing but an idiotic, populist, ill-considered appeal to voters without the knowledge to dismiss it with the contempt it deserves.
It is also an astonishing dismissal of one of the cores of the conservative parties: to limit the intervention of government in the workings of the economy.
We Australians deserve better from our ‘leaders’ than opportunistic and destructive policy statements.
May 16, 2024 | Change, Governance, Innovation, Leadership, retail, Strategy
The recent declaration of “A Future Made in Australia” by the Prime Minister has put the future shape of the nation’s manufacturing sector back on the agenda.
There was however, nothing specific on the importance of agricultural innovation and value adding through the manufacturing sector, or the strategic value of food security.
The decline in Australian owned manufacturing in the food industry has been close to total. The FMCG manufacturing industry has seen input prices increase by 49% over the decade to 2020, while the wholesale prices received have increased by only 24% over the same period (Source: AFGC Sustaining Australia Food and Grocery manufacturing 2030 report) This downturn, and the 20 years prior which display similar trends has seen locally owned businesses either go bankrupt, or become subsidiaries of foreign conglomerates, relegating them to mere outposts.
From an era where medium-sized businesses thrived across various product categories, employing significant numbers in quality, engineering, the trades, and R&D, today these businesses have largely disappeared. This transition has been marked by a shift towards centralisation of product development and scientific research abroad, leaving Australian operations with minimal operational and decision-making authority.
This trend raises critical questions of how we feed ourselves, and make a useful contribution to the global food supply.
Notwithstanding the international ownership of most of food and beverage manufacturing, it contributes 6.5% of GDP, 32% of total manufacturing output, and employs 240,000 people, 40% of which are in regional areas. (source AFGC)
By any measure, the food manufacturing sector is profoundly important to Australians. Its future resilience and growth of sovereign capability should be paramount.
The lack of sovereign control of the resources and capital needs to generate growth is disturbing.
Central to an innovative and resilient manufacturing industry is the capacity to generate intellectual capital that translates into manufactured product. The progressive ‘internationalisation’ of company R&D noted above, has been matched by a progressive emasculation of the sovereign capability to generate the Intellectual capital necessary for long term growth. There is a significant number of SME’s in the sector, but collectively they contribute very little to the total of manufactured product. They are typically mixing often imported ingredients in low tech environments with a few employees and casuals. Distribution is largely through secondary channels like farmers markets, and local retailers and food service. They do not have the resources to compete with the R&D capability of multinationals, and the previously available intellectual assistance from federal and state institutions has been removed.
Take for example the CSIRO that in the past worked closely with business. Often this was in an informal and personal collaboration between individuals that enabled a thriving environment for problem solving and innovation. CSIRO’s sites in North Ryde, Werribee, and Canon Hill have either been downsized or sold off, and skilled, experienced employees made redundant. Contributing to this erosion of the collaboration that in the past generated much of the ‘ideation’ that sets the stage for innovation, has been the demands of successive governments for a ‘productivity dividend’. This was typically 2% annually which compounds quickly to a killer blow to capability. It is code for removing those informal but fundamental creative collaborations with domestic companies, and encouraging the multinationals to centralise R&D elsewhere.
The power of the supermarket chains, currently under scrutiny has also played a key role in this process. SME’s simply do not have the deep pockets required to generate and maintain traction through the retail FMCG oligopoly.
To be successful, SME’s need to be able to absorb the reality of this gross power imbalance with retailers. Financial capital is necessary to enable the generation of the Intellectual Capital that underpins genuine innovation. Further investment is required to design, build and install the equipment to produce the innovative product. Deep pockets are then required to meet the retail trading term and promotional demands, as well as investment in the advertising necessary to attract consumers to a new product. As the power of the retailers has overwhelmed the diminishing group of domestic suppliers, we have been left with multinational suppliers and retailer house-brands, themselves often manufactured offshore.
The focus of government policies remains short-term, driven by electoral cycles rather than the decades required to bridge the gap between science and commercial success. Differing jurisdictions follow their own nose, resulting in a siloed and fragmented effort across the country, rather than a coherent and coordinated effort. The outcome is a mix of differing priorities, investment plans and initiatives around the country, sometimes used as incentives for business location. The commercial equivalent would be if a conglomerate allowed divisions and locations to compete for resources with declining levels of investment in the total absence of a coherent strategy. No sensible commercial board of directors would put up with such a self-defeating arrangement.
Grant programs send the wrong message and encourage behaviour that rarely delivers the outcomes touted in the press releases.
Culturally and politically risk is toxic to the body politic. However, the acknowledgement and management of risk is a fundamental element in successful innovation.
Successful risk management becomes a function of the extent to which a whole range of data, combined with qualitative assessment of what the future will look like is considered. Removing the capacity to make those assessments severely compromises the value of any conclusion reached.
The only potential solution to those institutional blockages to innovation in manufacturing industries generally is a confronting one.
Government needs to ‘upskill’ itself to be in a position to substitute early equity funding for grant funding.
Such a change requires a cohort of skills and experience not currently available within government and bureaucracies, but selectively available in industry. The early equity would be recoverable by those that are successful at a pre-agreed point, at a pre-agreed rate. This removes the inertia and rent seeking evident in grant funding, replacing it with a modified form of Venture Capital.
In addition, FIRB needs to adjust the guidelines that currently rely on an intense focus on the economics of ‘Comparative advantage’. These rely on projections of current and past quantitative models of industries that usually bear little resemblance to what ultimately evolves. They never reflect the strategic value of sovereign manufacturing.
In the absence of meaningful strategic change, what remains of the domestically owned food manufacturing industry of any scale will disappear, and current and new SME’s will have no hope of replacing them.
Notes.
- The budget delivered on Tuesday night included a number of measures that should serve to give manufacturers some confidence that the government has recognised there is a problem, and that action was long overdue.
- A slightly edited (and improved) version of this post was published on Wednesday morning on the AuManufacturing website and Linkedin group.
Apr 2, 2024 | Branding, Change, retail
The retail landscape is changing, even as the two retail gorillas hunker down and set about extracting more from the current model.
Following are a few of the macro trends I see that will continue to erode the current model that has been so successful.
Declining customer loyalty.
I have no numbers, but anecdotally, where in the past you shopped at Coles or Woollies, now you have Aldi, Farmers markets, Costco, Harris Farm, and a range of specialty retailers all competing successfully for the consumers dollar. I no longer know why anyone sees any of the major retailers as ‘their’ store. Loyalty is something that is given in acknowledgement of great service, and the gorillas have failed in that space.
Changing customer habits.
Associated with loyalty, customers are looking for things other than just the lowest price. Increasingly they want product provenance, domestically produced product, they are increasingly sensitive to the ingredient lists, and spurious health claims. This is all happening as the gorillas remove the options from their shelves in the game of short-term margins.
The continued growth of home delivery by the gorillas since Covid gave it a turbo-boost seems here to stay. Interestingly, home delivery also seems to be a useful brand building tool for the gorillas. Anecdotally, consumers tend to stick with one or the other of Coles or Woolies for delivery in greater numbers than they exhibit loyalty when shopping for themselves.
Investment attraction.
Aldi has invested successfully, Costco while going more slowly than expected, appear here to stay, farmers markets have become ‘corporatized’ to some extent, Harris Farm continues to invest, and specialty stores continue to ‘pop up’ although few survive for the long term. It seems that the market is sufficiently big, that with only two major players there is risk capital going in at the fringes, and in the long term, the fringes tend to become mainstream. Looming over all this is the shadow of Amazon, and more generally the move away from the bricks and mortar business model. I was betting a few years ago that the Harris family would cash in and sell to Amazon, a transaction consistent with their strategy in the US. So far, I have been wrong.
More recently, the public and political attention focussed on the gorillas can only have a negative impact on the investment attraction of FMCG retail.
Business model proliferation at the fringes.
While the supermarket model absolutely dominates the current landscape, technology and changing consumer attitudes are enabling evolving business models to compete for the consumers dollar. Two of my neighbours combine to buy meat in bulk direct from a farmer in the Southern highlands. It started as all the meat from a single animal, which meant lots of mince. Recently much of that mince is being made into sausages, and they are experimenting with differing sausage flavours for variety. This proliferation seems to me to be another signpost that change is coming, like it or not.
Margin pressure.
While all this is going on, margins through the supply chain are under increasing competitive pressure. This pressure impacts enormously on the decision making of incumbents, offering niche opportunities to newcomers and new business models to make a case with consumers.
It seems to me that the incumbent retailers are waiting to see what happens. History tells us that this is not an effective strategy. The better course is to shape your future in some way that suits your aspirations. It would be naive to say this was easy, it is excruciatingly hard, which is why so few are able to make the transformations necessary.
I keep on harping about the failure of Woolworths to leverage the start they made with Thomas Dux. To my mind it was a classic strategic mistake to back away.
My conclusion is that the current management culture at both the retail gorillas lacks the courage to explore, be curious, make investments that are separate from the main business, and stick to them in the face of short-term challenges. Instead, they have chosen to hunker down and optimise the current model.
Mar 22, 2024 | Customers, retail, Small business
Anyone dealing with Australia’s two supermarket gorillas knows how hard it is.
You know the old adage:
Question: Where does a 400 kg gorilla sleep?
Answer: Anywhere they bloody like!
Over the 45 years I have rubbed up against them, beginning as a young bloke when there were a number of now disappeared alternative retailers, it has only become harder. However, the rules of dealing with them have not changed much, just become clearer and more cut-throat.
Some years ago I did a presentation to the CEO’s of the SME group of companies who were members of the food industry lobby group AFGC. Looking back on that presentation, republished in several places, it is clear little has changed, certainly not for the better for battling SME’s.
My advice to those I work with also has not changed much, and can be summarised as:
- Have a solid commercial foundation before you contemplate the challenges of distribution through supermarkets.
- Never forget that retailers might be your customers, but they are not your consumers. At best they are a massive barrier between you and your consumers.
- Be relentlessly focussed on your long- term strategy, while recognising retailers are only the means to that end, not the end itself.
- Unless you are clearly differentiated from others, particularly in the minds of consumers, you will be a retailers breakfast.
- Know your numbers intimately. This is the barrier upon which most are wrecked, they have insufficient control and understanding of all their costs, margins, risks, and cash flow.
- Be very willing to say ‘No’ and live with the consequences, as they will almost always be better than the consequences of saying ‘Yes’.
These basic rules, and several others were the topics of conversation in a podcast with Chelsea Ford, published yesterday. The links to the podcast on Spotify and Apple are below.
🎧 Spotify: https://lnkd.in/dWzMN5mN
🎧 Apple Podcasts: https://lnkd.in/dq7yWGJZ
Mar 21, 2024 | Collaboration, Governance, Marketing, retail, Strategy
Collaboration between competitors is illegal, but tough to prove. It is also the natural state of affairs in an oligopoly.
When a competitive market evolves over time into an oligopoly, the focus of management attention of the remaining oligopolists moves from the customer to the competitor. With the resources available to an oligopolist in any decent sized market, they will know in considerable detail the strategies, internal processes, pricing, and resource allocation choices made by their competitors almost as quickly as they happen.
Supermarket competition in Australia has evolved in this manner. It has turned from ruthless competition for customers 40 years ago, to ruthless collaboration between the two major players now.
Collaboration is illegal, and I am sure that the leaders of the two supermarket gorillas are not setting prices together, or collaborating in other ways that would be contrary to the competition laws in this country. However, given there are only two of them, and they have the resources to watch the other very carefully, there is a sort of quasi co-operation that emerges.
It is driven by the commonality of their activities: The need for shareholder returns, driven by market share acquisition costs, both fixed and variable. They work aggressively on both, and if they did not, the senior management would be fired. In addition, directors have legislated fiduciary responsibilities under the Corporations act in relation to shareholder interests and importantly, returns.
We must also remember that via our superannuation funds, we are all shareholders in Coles and Woolworths.
Once again, just like the ‘housing crisis’, we have short term populist press release driven band-aids being suggested. They are touted as the remedy for long term strategic choices made in the past that to some, have turned sour.
The time for institutional concern about the increasing power of supermarket chains was when they were assembling the scale they now have. All of the take-overs and mergers that have happened have been waved through by the ACCC. This is despite commentary at the time about the impact of the lessening of competition for the consumers dollar.
Now it is too late, other remedies must be found, which do not include a forced break-up. Apart from the immorality of retrospectively applying new rules to the conduct of business, there is no logical or practical way to break apart either of the supermarket chains.
We should stop bleating, and get on with life, while ensuring we do not make the same mistake again.
Header credit: Gapinvoid.com. The cartoon put a huge amount of meaning into a simple graphical form. Thanks Hugh!!
