Feb 8, 2023 | Governance, retail, Strategy
We all need to eat, but we seem to take for granted the access to processed and fresh food and groceries. To consider the ‘food industry’ as one entity ignores the entirely different strategic drivers of the three main components: Raw material production or ‘farming’, Manufacturing, and retail.
They should be treated separately as while interdependent, they are driven by entirely different forces.
In addition to food products in the FMCG basket, you have many non-food items from cleaning and homewares to health, beauty, and personal and pet care categories. Go into any supermarket, and these non-food categories take up somewhere around 20% of shelf space.
Farming.
The ‘family farm’ used to dominate the farming sector, but that is diminishing as scale enabled by capital takes the place of family intergenerational ownership. Costs come down with corporate ownership, but you are most likely to see agricultural monocultures emerge, as short-term financial returns creep up the priority list.
The register of foreign ownership, flawed as it is, records in the latest report June 2021, that 14.1% of agricultural land is in foreign hands, up from 10.9% the previous year. The National Farmers Federation estimates that 99% of farm enterprises are owned by Australians. Clearly the big are getting bigger at the expense of the small.
The infrastructure necessary for the management of farm production requires substantial investment, the rail networks have broken down, and the roads are a mess. This is a long-term problem, and the logistic costs of farming will increase faster than the inflation rate.
Manufacturing.
A report from the AFGC concludes that profitability is declining, due largely to the concentration of retail, and that imports will gain ground as a result. Currently the food & beverage manufacturing industry employs 276,000 people, 40% of them in regional areas, and has an output value of 127 billion, 32% of total Australian manufacturing output. In other words, it is big and diverse both geographically and demographically, and therefore should hold a significant place in the thinking about how we educate and groom future leaders.
The gross figures for the industry indicate that there is almost 30% of production value exported. Problem is that the vast majority of this is raw or minimally processed meat and grain, employing few people, anywhere in their supply chains, and competing in commodity markets.
Of The 8 directors of the Australian Food and Grocery Council, the industry’s ‘representative’ body, one is the CEO of an Australian beverage company, the other 9 are all the chief executives of multinationals. This is not a bad thing beyond the obvious fact that it perpetuates the lobbying and resulting policy positions of government in favour of MNC’s vs the locally owned industry.
As a young bloke coming into FMCG in the late 70’s after a few years as a nomad, there were many businesses of a whole range of sizes and types to work for. Over time, the number and diversity has been radically reduced. Significant industries like dairy are now almost complete branch offices of multinationals. The exception is produce, where there are still many farming suppliers, although there are now a few very big consolidators, like Costas, who dominate the supply chain into retail. There are no proprietary produce brands in retail, beyond a couple of minor organic brands. Retailers have ensured that they absorb all the proprietary margin in produce.
If there is a light in the tunnel starting to be seen evolving as a result of the disruption of supply chains, and the low profitability of FMCG manufacturing, it may be Bega. Bega Cheese, which was rescued from the clutches of the receiver by now foreign owned Dairy Farmers Ltd way back in (about) 1991, has been able to expand by buying the Port Melbourne site of Kraft, as it was taken over by Mondelez, and ending up being able to buy the Vegemite brand, and more recently the rebranded peanut butter business. Perhaps this is the beginning of a resurgence?
Retail.
Grocery market size and share in Australia is debateable depending on what is included. By most analyses, Woolworths has around 37% share, Coles 28%, and Aldi, now the real third force 11%, and the wholesaler supplied groups around 7%. The remaining 17% is made up of a patchwork of fresh and farmers markets, direct from farm delivery, small independent retailers, and convenience outlets.
In addition to grocery, there is the huge food service market, varying from the local owner operated restaurant and takeaway, to fast food chains and five-star dining. This sector consumes a large amount of product and employs thousands of people.
The power wielded by this bloc of 76% of grocery sales is immense. As they have scaled out of the ruck that was the retail playing field in the 70’s and 80’s, taking over or leaving to the receiver less robust competitors. They have squeezed manufacturer margins by a range of strategic weapons that are a classic case study of Michael Porters 5 forces. In response, manufacturers have similarly scaled by using regional manufacturing hubs, most often in Asia. The impact on domestically owned manufacturing has been dramatic, accelerated during the period where the $A was above parity with the $US, which encouraged wider adoption of house brands manufactured overseas, wiping out what remained of locally owned manufacturing. With a couple of notable exceptions, (San Remo, and now Bega, and Sanitarium who do not pay tax, for example) Australian owned food manufacturing is down to sub scale cottage manufacturers relying on the fragmented but still difficult 24% not controlled by the three retail gorillas.
It is fair to acknowledge the strategic failure of local management, while throwing rocks at the retailers. There used to be major FMCG brands owned by domestic businesses, built up over extended periods that failed to recognise the long-term strategic importance of maintaining their brands. Instead, they surrendered to the tactical demands of retailers for short term promotional dollars that assisted retail margins while keeping prices low. Short term, consumers may have benefitted from the price competition while having significantly less choice. Long term, they face the impact of an economy that has only a tiny proportion of its biggest manufacturing industry being able to make strategic choices driven by domestic priorities.
A few thoughts about the future.
Technology cannot do anything but increasingly impose itself on the industry, in all its components. Australia is already a world leader in the development and deployment of Agricultural technology. Failure to accelerate the rate of innovation will find Australian agriculture losing the current productivity edge we have, as while we are really good farmers, the soils of the continent are old and poor, subject to significant climatic risks Therefore to keep our position, we must continue to be smarter.
Innovations in retail are happening elsewhere. ‘Amazon Go’ type technology will transform the shopping experience, and home delivery will not be going away. Meanwhile Australian retailers are wedded to optimising the business model that has made them successful in the past. This will open up opportunities for alternative retail formats and processes.
Retailers are good at retailing, but have been proven to be lousy at product innovation. In the past, product and category innovation has come from businesses tapped into the consumer psyche. Unfortunately, those businesses are virtually gone, so where is the next innovation going to spring form? Certainly not from the office of a buyer whose KPI’s are all about margin today
The logistic infrastructure so vital in a country as large and diverse as Australia is in poor shape. Rail networks are broken, roads are going the same way, a trend recently accelerated by flooding, and you cannot get drivers of heavy and long-haul equipment easily. The median age of all transport drivers is approaching 50, and long-haul semi drivers is now 55, and they are not being replaced. When considering specialised driving jobs like picking up cattle from farms, the situation is already dire.
In summary, the Australian food industry is faced with a series of significant challenges that have evolved over a long period. They will not be effectively addressed by industry or public authorities that think in terms of only a four or five year strategic horizon.
Note: this post was first published in the auManufacturing Linkedin group in December last year.
Mar 7, 2022 | Change, retail, Strategy
The supermarket business model, like most others, is evolving as we watch. It is slower in Australia than elsewhere given the challenge of distance and the stranglehold of Coles and Woolies. Nevertheless, it is evolving, and we can learn from elsewhere.
Four years ago, with great fanfare, Tesco in the UK launched a discount supermarket chain they called ‘Jack’s’. It was intended to compete with discounters Aldi and Lidl, to be the British hammer blow on the invading German discount retailers.
At the time, it seemed to me that the game was already up, that the position the discounters had carved in the market would be impervious to the exhortations of then Tesco MD David Lewis, calling Britain to arms.
Prior to the launch of Jacks, there was considerable shuffling of deck chairs as other retailers, Sainsbury and Asda particularly adjusted to the discounters by M&A. Since then of course we have had the fiasco of Brexit, still evolving amongst the shattered supply chains. This has been graphically illustrated by the carnage at the port of Dover, and inability of British farmers to farm in the absence of eastern European labour.
Now Jacks is closing, its promises of stores in every major town never eventuating. Jacks only ever opened thirteen stores, six of which will be converted to Tesco, the other seven just closed.
At the time in a post I reminisced on the demise of discounters in Australia, saying ‘I suspect history will reveal that Tesco has made a huge blue’. At least they recognised the mistake relatively early and reversed course under a new MD.
Given Australia tends to follow the evolution of the British supermarket sector by a year or two, what can we anticipate domestically, particularly from the two current retail gorillas, Woolies and Coles?
- I would not expect either to make the mistake Tesco made and open a discounter. In the past, both have dabbled with discount retail brands, none of which have survived. Besides, they have both watched as Aldi has carved out a place without launching a discount rival, it is unlikely they will change direction now.
- The doubling down on home delivery will continue, as will the logistic arrangements that support home delivery, and the technology that enables it.
- Retail is fragmenting. Consumer behaviour is evolving rapidly, accelerated by Covid. There is an obvious trend towards on-line and specialist retail using multiple channels of distribution, attracting consumers from their large-scale competitors by offering other than ‘average’ products. Some retailers are designing their stores as an ‘experience’ as much as a place to shop. These stores are a brick in the brand building wall, and are in effect, another form of media as well as a retail outlet. Apple saw this first, opening stores progressively around the world. By the traditional retail measure of success of margin/sq foot, Apple is now the most successful retailer in the world. At the other end, we see small stores, even ‘pop-ups’ selling very specific and focussed ranges. In between, shopping malls have passed their peak, the massive floor space they occupy will need to be re-purposed, at least in part. The potential here is for locally focussed office and residential hubs with a mix of specialist stores and entertainment venues.
- Direct to consumer from the farm is increasingly possible and attractive. Farmers markets will continue to grow and nibble away at the supermarket share of produce, by delivering superior taste and quality. I love so called ‘summer fruit’, peaches, nectarines, and plums. Finding any in a supermarket that do not feel and taste like a cricket ball is impossible, as they are picked in bulk and green to survive the supermarket supply chain. They may look OK, but the taste is what really counts, and here they miss out badly to specialist stores.
- Harris Farm has considerable potential if they can resist the temptation to become more like a ‘chain’. Woolies had a go at high quality specialist food retailing with Thomas Dux, and at first got the recipe right. Sadly, success breeds intervention by the back office boys who never actually see a customers, which resulted in ‘Dux’ being sent to the naughty corner to die.
- Automation in big distribution centres will continue to drive costs out of the system. Ocado, the British online grocer is licencing their technology around the world. Coles did a deal with them back in 2019 to build two automated fulfilment centres, which will feed into their home delivery strategy and no doubt generate a lot of thinking for the standard supermarket Distribution Centre logistics chain.
- Aldi will continue to grow, more slowly than to date, as they expand store numbers in an already saturated market. Costco with currently thirteen locations around Australia have the potential to double in the next few years. Their differentiator is an entirely different business model, which is very hard to copy for any established retailer.
- The demise of proprietary brands in Australian FMCG has probably reached its lowest point. Coles and Woolies have ransacked the profitability of their supply base, who have responded with little or no investment in genuine innovation, ultimately the only source of real growth. I suspect that some smaller brands may start to reappear as Coles and Woolies seek to differentiate themselves from each other, Aldi, and the alternative distribution channels slowly emerging.
- The big retailers will, or should, start to experiment with some of the technology proving successful in the US and China. The obvious place for such an experiment is in some of the CBD locations they both have. Shoppers looking for a quick shop for dinner as they run for the train home, might value the sort of service offered by Amazon Go and others.
- Managing inventory for suppliers will become even more difficult. Retailers are continuing to reduce their order quantities while increasing the order frequency and placing rigid delivery times on suppliers. This volatility is making supplier demand planning progressively more challenging, while getting paid in a reasonable time means they are funding the retailers. I suspect there will be technical solutions to demand planning evolving that involve AI, interacting in real time with store traffic, weather, and events to deliver a demand number by location. It may be that the DC starts to pack retail shelves, which are delivered on a roll in roll out basis to stores, removing the in-store labour and reducing back store footprint size. At Dairy Farmers 30 years ago, we experimented with this idea for fresh milk, and while it was promising, it did not catch on. Just 30 years too early?
- The physical movement through the supply chains is an increasing problem for supermarkets. Traffic density, and fewer drivers available as the old guard retires, unreplaced by a new driver cohort willing to accept the rigors of driving semis in heavy traffic for 12 hours a day. Combined with the challenge of demand planning, this will increase the number of product out of stock at the retail face, encouraging consumers to alternatives.
No business model remains unchallenged, and can remain unchanged in the face of evolving competitive circumstances. The supermarket business model is no different, although proving to be more resilient than I had thought it would be a decade ago. The core assumption of the business model however remains unchanged. They control a choke point in the supply chain, and take a margin that reflects their power on both sides of that choke point.
Jan 31, 2022 | Change, Innovation, retail
Life in FMCG world is, almost unbelievably, becoming more competitive than it has ever been. However, the nature of competition has changed radically over the last 25 years.
Performance measures that we have relied on in the past no longer serve as well, we need a rethink.
The business model, while retaining the foundations that had delivered such success to supermarket chains in the past, has morphed.
No longer do big brands hold sway.
I suggest ‘Net Distribution Gain’ should be a standard measure in the FMCG marketer’s toolbox.
The previous business model used to be big add budgets splashed on TV, an OK product that appealed to the general average consumer, drove weight of distribution and shelf offtake.
That has all changed.
Most brands have disappeared, for those remaining, the name of the game is shelf space and position.
Where there used to be 5 or 6 brands competing in a decent sized category, there is now one, sometimes two, or at most three proprietary brands in big categories competing with house brands under various guises. These remaining brands have eroded their position by allowing retailers to convert their marketing budgets from brand building into price promotion, shelf position, and retailer margin enhancement.
Gaining distribution these days is a matter of buying it, and for a new product, if you are successful, there will be a copy house brand coming very quickly.
The outcome of all this is that innovation is at an all-time low, and the cycle just accelerates.
Retailers practise the one in one out method, it has become a standard procedure across supermarket retailers. It recognises their inelastic store sides and imposes minimum sales discipline on the suppliers.
For a supplier, having one of your competitors products deleted to make room for yours is a win, but for the retailer, it makes little difference which SKU is sold beyond any differences in the delivered margin. However, genuinely new products, ones that warrant net new space in a category, are where the real category gains and marketing success lie hidden.
NDG should be a standard measure to use by suppliers considering the planning and KPI of product launch strategies. There are several choices, which could become very complex with the addition of a weighting index based on shelf position:
One in one out of your range
Yours in, competitor SKU out
New space for the category.
Clearly in the last case the retailer is making choices elsewhere in the category mix, and the ripples widen, but for the category marketer, a NDG would be an indicator of a successful genuinely new product as distinct from a line extension of a successful competitive SKU.
Dec 13, 2021 | Customers, retail
A dictionary will define price as something like: “The amount of money for which something is sold’
Pretty obvious.
However, price can mean many different things to different people in different contexts.
Years ago, I ran a food manufacturing business that sold product through multiple distribution channels. Supermarkets, route trade, distributors, food service, direct via our own vans, and export.
The pricing architecture had a common starting point, the ‘List price’ after which everything changed depending on a wide range of factors such as: the relative power of the channel, volumes, payment terms, negotiated promotional and incentive programs, supply and demand at any specific time, geography, variable freight charges, seasonal factors, clearance prices, rebates, and others.
Exactly the same products, subject to a whole range of variations, both formulaic and negotiated.
In that complexity, how do you define what the ‘right’ price is?
At one point we made the attempt to calculate the actual price based on the net cash flow from the products and customers. In the days before flexible digital tools, this was a brain buster, and consumed too much time and effort to deliver a return, but was a good idea at the time.
Added to the complexity which discourages most from developing the understanding necessary to optimise whatever the net price ends up being, is the impact of unintended consequences and the channel conflict that is almost inevitable.
For example, the small retailers we serviced saw their competitors as the supermarkets and were very noisy indeed when they could buy a case of product at Woolies cheaper than they could buy it direct or via a distributor. They did not care about the nuances of our pricing architecture, or the fact that they might buy a case, and a supermarket buy multiple truckloads. Their concern was serving their customers by not having them go to Woolies for cheaper prices, while remaining profitable.
As a young bloke doing the backpack thing around Europe, I stayed at one point for a few weeks on a small Greek island. On the occasions a cruise ship came in, the retailers of all types simply substituted one price list and price display for another, somewhat more expensive. The locals knew not to buy that day. Amazon takes that flexible pricing strategy to the limit with its use of your browsing and purchase history to automatically set the price their algorithms indicate gives them the best combination of the purchase being made at the maximum margin.
So, what is the right price?
Whatever you and the buyer who completes a transaction determine it to be, in those circumstances, on that particular day.
Dec 1, 2021 | Branding, Innovation, retail
Promotional pricing is often the only tool used to generate volume. Ask any salesperson ‘Why’ and they will say ‘because it works’. Go next door and ask a marketer, and their response is more likely to be something like: ‘to encourage non-users to try the product, and if they like it, to come back, become loyal customers’
Therein lies the paradox. The well intentioned promotion of a brand results in killing it.
By promotional pricing the product down, you reward current users who would have bought at full price, while not being effective at persuading potentially new users to try for any reason other than price.
The power of habit is huge in routine purchases, like the ones we make every week in the supermarket. A regular consumer is not necessarily loyal to a particular brand, they are more unthinking, more habitual than most marketers will concede, especially to themselves. If a choice is to be made to change brands, that decision takes up cognitive capacity better dedicated elsewhere, and involves risk, which we are programmed by evolution to avoid.
To change habits, we must change behaviour, an extremely challenging thing to do.
Psychologists have found over and over, the best way to change habits is to change little things, one at a time, progressively leading to the changed behaviour that in its turn becomes a habit. Each stage takes 3 or 4 times to become sufficiently entrenched to start to take on the characteristics of a habit.
Back to our supermarket.
Price promotions follow each other on a weekly basis. No brand is given the time to establish its routine purchase as a new behaviour, as there is a price promotion of an alternative brand every week, often several at the same time.
The net result is that for every product on shelf, the discounted price becomes the ‘real’ price, which becomes less and less relevant as consumers are trained by the retailers to think that the discount price is the real price for the products and the categories.
That, in a nutshell, is why we are seeing less and less brands on the supermarket shelves, and as a direct result, less and less innovation, as suppliers have little chance of recouping development costs in such an environment.
Nov 29, 2021 | Customers, retail
On Friday last week, I had to go into the city. About 10.00am I turned up at Town hall station, and the shopping precinct around it was crowded, people lining up to get into shops that a few days previously were deserted.
It took me a while to realise that it was ‘Black Friday’.
Retailers were making extreme offers to generate a sale, and seemed to be succeeding. When I got back to my home office and opened my computer, it was deluged with digital ‘Black Friday’ specials from everyone to whom I had deliberately or inadvertently given my email address since 2010. ‘90% off Black Friday Special’ was not an uncommon header.
‘Black Friday’ is the wrong description, coming as it does from the US where it joined Mother’s Day and Father’s Day created by Hallmark cards, as a marketing construct. In contrast, Black Friday should be called ‘Stupid Discount Day’ or ‘The day we went broke’.
The attraction of deep discounts does a few things to a retailer’s sales numbers:
- Generates volume, (hopefully) sometimes at a loss on the discounted item, so retailers are hoping you buy something else at the same time to recover margin. This volume comes, if it comes, with the advertising costs. For a small retailer, these costs might be just a few banners in the window, and someone outside the store spruiking, but are more likely to include some email marketing, and social media posts, and usually some of which are paid to generate reach.
- Rewards non-customers who buy once, try, and you hope come back. Rarely happens, especially in the madness of a mass discount.
- Attracts the worst customers, those who never buy anything at full price, who only chase discounts. It is often these same customers who create most customer service costs.
- Rewards existing customers who would have bought anyway at full price This usually results in a ‘pantry stock’ that kills sales and margin in subsequent periods.
- Erodes brand positioning, sometimes built up over years, establishing a new ‘base price’ for their products and brands.
Most of the offers in my computer were for digital products, where the marginal cost is zero, so they can give away 90% price and not go into the red. Bricks and Mortar retailers, the ones with queues outside them in the QVB, Town Hall station underground mall, and the giant Westfield next door do not have the luxury of zero marginal cost.
I suspect many of these retailers are desperate after 2 years of struggle, and desperation often leads to very poor decision making.
Hopes that deep discounting will increase volumes sufficiently to recover margin are almost always in vain. When you do the numbers, depending on the gross margin, and additional promotional expenses, volumes have to increase by a factor of at least 3 or 4 in order to break even. The more frequent outcome is a very nasty shock when the P&L is done at the end of the month.
Anyone can sell anything at a deep discount. It does not make you successful, just thoughtless, desperate, stupid, or a bit of all three. The lesson should be, not to go broke being successful.
