Breaking up supermarkets: A really stupid idea.

Breaking up supermarkets: A really stupid idea.

 

The pile-on to Coles and Woolworths as protagonists in the ‘cost of living crisis’ and accusations of gouging, is somewhat akin to the ‘burning of witches’ in Salem in 1692. (in fact, most of the 16 executed were hanged, but never let a good story get in the way of a fact). The population just needs a victim to blame for their poor fortune, anyone will do, never mind their lack of guilt.

If there was any guilt involved in the lead up to the current ‘crisis’ it would have been allayed by a factual examination of the supply chains in use by retailers, and the drivers of those chains.

It is true that Coles and Woolworths are amongst the most financially successful retailers in the world. This is a position evolved from a long history of take-overs and mergers in the supermarket industry, endorsed by those with the power to stop them. Coles and Woolworths have by this process, as well as their own efforts to attract and keep consumers, have accumulated the scale that enables them to deliver superior returns their shareholders, a group that includes every Australian with superannuation. Had they not performed in this way, the boards of these businesses would have relieved be MD’s of their role. On occasions over the last 40 years I have been watching, there have been a number of MD’s so sent on gardening duty.

So, where should the blame be laid, if there is to be any laid?

None of the various reports have laid bare the mechanics of the supply chains at work. At best they refer to them in passing. However, the antidote to the unreasonable exercising of power back through a supply chain, which is the hypothesis of all the proponents of the gouging story, is transparency.

It is true that Coles and Woolworths can be brutal with their suppliers. Not every supplier is treated equally, and dumb, insensitive, and even discriminatory choices are made, but that situation exists in every walk of life. You do not address these shortcomings by regulation, you address them with transparency.

I used the two dimensional scale in the header to score Coles and Woolworths based on my experiences over 45 years. Despite the current voluntary code of conduct, seemingly about to be made mandatory, the transparency scores for both retailers are concentrated on the bottom left of the scale.

The first three ‘transparency milestones’ get a tick, as 1 or 2 out of five. They are present but only to ensure some level of quality and to protect the retailers from litigation.

The ‘supply chain scope’ measures for both give solid scores in the internal operations, a pass for direct suppliers, but nothing beyond a passing interest in the final two.

Divestiture will not change any of that. It would simply add cost to the supply chains previously wrung out by scale.

A break-up requires a party willing and able to stump up the capital to complete a transaction. To generate a return on that investment it would be necessary to rise prices to accommodate the increased costs. It is unlikely any domestic group would be a buyer, which just leaves an international chain being handed a stepping stone, which is equally unlikely to reduce process in any way.

If the authorities were really interested in adjusting the profitability of the retailers in favour of their suppliers, who have been scrambling for scale for as long as the retailers have, they need to throw the divestiture story into the bin marked ‘stupid idea’ and consider mechanisms that address the core of the problem: measures that favour those with capital at the expense of those who do not.

Divestiture makes a good headline in populist press, but like many good headlines, has absolutely no substance.

 

Header: courtesy of HBR ‘How transparent is your supply chain ‘ August 2019 Bateman & Bonanni

 

The two separate faces of AI.

The two separate faces of AI.

 

AI is the latest new shiny thing in everybody’s sightline.

It seems to me that AI has two faces, a bit like the Roman God Janus.

On one hand we have the large language models or Generatively Pre-trained Transformers, and on the other we have the tools that can be built by just about anyone to do a specific task, or range of tasks, using the GPT’s.

The former requires huge ongoing capital investments in the technology, and infrastructure necessary for operations. There are only a few companies in the position to make those investments: Microsoft, Amazon, Meta, Apple, and perhaps a few others should they choose to do so. (in former days, Governments might consider investing in such fundamental infrastructure, as they did in roads, power generation, water infrastructure)

At the other end of the scale are the tools which anybody could build using the technology provided by the owners of the core technology and infrastructure.

These are entirely different.

Imagine if Thomas Edison and Nikola Tesla between them had managed to be the only ones in a position to generate electricity. They sold that energy to anybody who had a use for it from powering factories, to powering the Internet, to home appliances.

That is the situation we now have with those few who own access to the technology and anybody else who chooses to build on top of it.

The business models that enabled both to grow and prosper are as yet unclear, but becoming clearer every day.

For example, Apple has spent billions developing the technology behind Siri and Vision Pro, neither of which has evolved into a winning position. In early June (2024) Apple and OpenAI did a deal to incorporate ChatGPT into the Apple operating system.

It is a strategic master stroke.

Apple will build a giant toll booth into the hyper-loyal and generally cashed up user base of Apple. Going one step further, they have branded it ‘Apple Intelligence’. In effect, they have created an ‘AI house-brand.’ Others commit to the investment, and Apple charges for access to their user base, with almost no marginal cost.

Down the track, Apple will conduct an auction amongst the few suppliers of AI technology and infrastructure for that access to their user base. To wrangle an old metaphor, they stopped digging for gold, and started selling shovels.

Masterstroke.

It means they can move their focus from the core GPT technology, to providing elegant tools to users of the Apple ecosystem, and charge for the access.

What will be important in the future is not just the foundation technology, which will be in a few hands, but the task specific tools that are built on top of the technology, leveraging its power.

 

 

The demise of Google, or a new beginning?

The demise of Google, or a new beginning?

 

 

80% of Googles revenue comes from advertising. The obvious question is how the explosion of AI after the release of ChatGPT will impact on that revenue, and virtual monopoly of search that delivers it.

Rather than typing in a query and getting pages and pages of options for an answer, headed by 5 or six links that have paid to be at the top of the first page, AI will give you an ‘exact’ single answer.

At least you hope it will be the right answer.

If it is a simple black and white question, like what is the capital of Australia, you can be pretty sure it will be right, but if you want a detailed explanation of the science of climate change, it will be insufficient, and potentially misleading.

However, in a world of instant gratification, the first answer that appears right will be accepted, and as the late Daniel Kahneman demonstrated, we like the quick, ‘fast’ response in favour of the considered ‘slow’ answer.

Google has responded to this existential threat to its profitability with a tool called ‘AI Overviews’, currently in beta. It summarises search results and presents them as a single answer to the query.

‘Overviews’ It operates on the principle of “satisficing,” or providing quick, decent answers rather than a range of options.

Presumably, the ‘toll-booth’ will still be at the point of click through, while advertisers will be given the option to be on the ‘satisficing’ menu, for a price. Not a lot of change from current, frankly.

However, the tectonic forces driving the adoption of Ai will have impacts across the face of business, government and our personal lives, few of which are easily forecastable.

Darwin’s dictum that it is not the biggest or fastest that survive, but the most adaptable to change will really be tested in the coming decade.

 

 

 

 

Strategy does not include execution.

Strategy does not include execution.

 

A short time ago I sat in a workshop where one of the featured speakers continued to conflate strategy and execution into the one process. Those who know me watched with amusement is I tried to maintain a philosophical silence. Rather than jumping up and pronouncing that such conflation is muddle headed at best, destructive at worst, I managed to maintain my seat.

This general lack of understanding that strategy and execution are separate processes has evolved from a number of sources.

Communication. Poor communication of the strategy, and separately, the role each function and individual have in the execution of the strategy via budgets and other means of resource allocation is unclear. Is unreasonable to expect those further down in an organisation to execute on a strategy they do not clearly understand, and even if they do, their role in the execution is unclear.

Size does matter. Organisations as they grow become more complex. As those complexities grow the difficulty of translating strategies into actual tasks that compound to deliver the strategic objective also compounds. Aggressive simplicity is the only antidote, and a huge challenge for management.

Technology overload. Technology often complicates clear communication, despite its ability quickly and efficiently to reach people. The fragmentation and complexity of communication channels serves to dilute the power of a simple message. In the absence of a clear articulation of the problem to be solved, job to be done, and recognition of existing conditions, people determine independently what a message means to them.

Turf wars. Unfortunately, in all organisations beyond about 30 people, politics and turf wars are common. In many large organisations, perhaps most, advancement and the trappings of that advancement go to the most effective political operatives. Merit in getting the job done often runs a long second. Turf wars by their nature work against a coherent collaborative strategic resource deployment.

Resources. In almost no organisation I have ever seen is there sufficient effort made to ensure aligned and consistent understanding of the strategies. That effort to communicate clearly is critical to enabling the allocation of necessary resources, at the optimum time, to deliver the envisaged outcome. Most often the communication morphs to resemble hyperbole.

These factors contribute to the general notion that strategy by itself is an exercise in obscure articulation, while execution is left to the ‘quants’ among us.

Effective strategic deployment requires that the causes of the mismatch noted above are reversed. This requires a culture that insurers feedback loops, flexibility, excellent and consistent communication, all of which come from a single source: leadership.

 

 

 

A Future Made in Australia: Does feeding ourselves count?

A Future Made in Australia: Does feeding ourselves count?

 

 

The recent declaration of “A Future Made in Australia” by the Prime Minister has put the future shape of the nation’s manufacturing sector back on the agenda.

There was however, nothing specific on the importance of agricultural innovation and value adding through the manufacturing sector, or the strategic value of food security.

The decline in Australian owned manufacturing in the food industry has been close to total. The FMCG manufacturing industry has seen input prices increase by 49% over the decade to 2020, while the wholesale prices received have increased by only 24% over the same period (Source: AFGC Sustaining Australia Food and Grocery manufacturing 2030 report) This downturn, and the 20 years prior which display similar trends has seen locally owned businesses either go bankrupt, or become subsidiaries of foreign conglomerates, relegating them to mere outposts.

From an era where medium-sized businesses thrived across various product categories, employing significant numbers in quality, engineering, the trades, and R&D, today these businesses have largely disappeared. This transition has been marked by a shift towards centralisation of product development and scientific research abroad, leaving Australian operations with minimal operational and decision-making authority.

This trend raises critical questions of how we feed ourselves, and make a useful contribution to the global food supply.

Notwithstanding the international ownership of most of food and beverage manufacturing, it contributes 6.5% of GDP, 32% of total manufacturing output, and employs 240,000 people, 40% of which are in regional areas. (source AFGC)

By any measure, the food manufacturing sector is profoundly important to Australians. Its future resilience and growth of sovereign capability should be paramount.

The lack of sovereign control of the resources and capital needs to generate growth is disturbing.

Central to an innovative and resilient manufacturing industry is the capacity to generate intellectual capital that translates into manufactured product. The progressive ‘internationalisation’ of company R&D noted above, has been matched by a progressive emasculation of the sovereign capability to generate the Intellectual capital necessary for long term growth. There is a significant number of SME’s in the sector, but collectively they contribute very little to the total of manufactured product. They are typically mixing often imported ingredients in low tech environments with a few employees and casuals. Distribution is largely through secondary channels like farmers markets, and local retailers and food service. They do not have the resources to compete with the R&D capability of multinationals, and the previously available intellectual assistance from federal and state institutions has been removed.

Take for example the CSIRO that in the past worked closely with business. Often this was in an informal and personal collaboration between individuals that enabled a thriving environment for problem solving and innovation. CSIRO’s sites in North Ryde, Werribee, and Canon Hill have either been downsized or sold off, and skilled, experienced  employees made redundant. Contributing to this erosion of the collaboration that in the past generated much of the ‘ideation’ that sets the stage for innovation, has been the demands of successive governments for a ‘productivity dividend’. This was typically 2% annually which compounds quickly to a killer blow to capability. It is code for removing those informal but fundamental creative collaborations with domestic companies, and encouraging the multinationals to centralise R&D elsewhere.

The power of the supermarket chains, currently under scrutiny has also played a key role in this process. SME’s simply do not have the deep pockets required to generate and maintain traction through the retail FMCG oligopoly.

To be successful, SME’s need to be able to absorb the reality of this gross power imbalance with retailers. Financial capital is necessary to enable the generation of the Intellectual Capital that underpins genuine innovation. Further investment is required to design, build and install the equipment to produce the innovative product. Deep pockets are then required to meet the retail trading term and promotional demands, as well as investment in the advertising necessary to attract consumers to a new product. As the power of the retailers has overwhelmed the diminishing group of domestic suppliers, we have been left with multinational suppliers and retailer house-brands, themselves often manufactured offshore.

The focus of government policies remains short-term, driven by electoral cycles rather than the decades required to bridge the gap between science and commercial success. Differing jurisdictions follow their own nose, resulting in a siloed and fragmented effort across the country, rather than a coherent and coordinated effort. The outcome is a mix of differing priorities, investment plans and initiatives around the country, sometimes used as incentives for business location. The commercial equivalent would be if a conglomerate allowed divisions and locations to compete for resources with declining levels of investment in the total absence of a coherent strategy. No sensible commercial board of directors would put up with such a self-defeating arrangement.

Grant programs send the wrong message and encourage behaviour that rarely delivers the outcomes touted in the press releases.

Culturally and politically risk is toxic to the body politic. However, the acknowledgement and management of risk is a fundamental element in successful innovation.

Successful risk management becomes a function of the extent to which a whole range of data, combined with qualitative assessment of what the future will look like is considered. Removing the capacity to make those assessments severely compromises the value of any conclusion reached.

The only potential solution to those institutional blockages to innovation in manufacturing industries generally is a confronting one.

Government needs to ‘upskill’ itself to be in a position to substitute early equity funding for grant funding.

Such a change requires a cohort of skills and experience not currently available within government and bureaucracies, but selectively available in industry. The early equity would be recoverable by those that are successful at a pre-agreed point, at a pre-agreed rate.  This removes the inertia and rent seeking evident in grant funding, replacing it with a modified form of Venture Capital.

In addition, FIRB needs to adjust the guidelines that currently rely on an intense focus on the economics of ‘Comparative advantage’. These rely on projections of current and past quantitative models of industries that usually bear little resemblance to what ultimately evolves. They never reflect the strategic value of sovereign manufacturing.

In the absence of meaningful strategic change, what remains of the domestically owned food manufacturing industry of any scale will disappear, and current and new SME’s will have no hope of replacing them.

Notes.

  1. The budget delivered on Tuesday night included a number of measures that should serve to give manufacturers some confidence that the government has recognised there is a problem, and that action was long overdue.
  2. A slightly edited (and improved) version of this post was published on Wednesday morning on the AuManufacturing website and Linkedin group.

 

Is 3% of GDP the right answer to our manufacturing complexity problem?

Is 3% of GDP the right answer to our manufacturing complexity problem?

 

 

As we seek to move towards 3% of GDP as a measure of the R&D in the economy, we are assuming that simply increasing the percentage will increase the output, in some sort of linear manner.

Ranking as we do at 93 on the Harvard list, squeezed between Uganda on 92, and Pakistan at 94, we need to do something different.

We have not asked the question: what changes need to be made to the multi-jurisdictional, fragmented and short-term focused system we have currently.

In my view we should.

Before we throw more effort and money into the existing system, we should be questioning if the system is able to deliver the outcomes being sought in an optimised manner.

Assuming we elect to keep the existing system, (a given I suspect) we should start by asking challenging strategic questions about the technology domains we need to focus on, that contribute to the shape of the economy we envisage in a decade or two.

That is easy to say, sadly, it is extraordinarily hard to do. It is even harder for the answers that may emerge to get any traction, by way of public awareness and funding. Without exception, the questions we must ask will run against the readily available answers that reflect just the extrapolation of the status quo, perhaps with a few wrinkles.

Inevitably, multiplying the complexity of the challenges faced will present problems with no apparent answers, or they would have been answered before. That is why the cycle from science to commercialised product is so long, in most cases, 30 years or more.

Change needs a catalyst, which usually comes from unexpected angles.

Take the development of mRNA vaccines during Covid.

To most this was a rushed and half-baked process, as we all know that the pharma innovation cycle is at least a decade, from identification of a molecule of value, through product development and increasingly demanding levels of clinical trial. Here, it happened in 18 months.

Thing is mRNA vaccine development did not happen in 18 months.

The logic of what became mRNA  was first articulated in 1956, and had been investigated continuously for the following 65 years. Suddenly the catalyst of Covid emerged, and the next decade or longer of development was compressed into the 18 months. This is simply because most of the work had been done, under the radar, and on a small scale, scientists knew it was extremely promising, they just lacked the catalyst and therefore the funds to prove it.

The question here was: can the expensive and technically very difficult production of mRNA be proved and scaled in 18 months? Clearly the answer was ‘yes’ and now we have mRNA as part of the pharma arsenal.

The PM has committed a billion dollars to developing a manufacturing plant in the Hunter that produces solar panels. On the surface, it is dumb, and has been condemned by many, including yours truly, and chair of the productivity Commission Danielle Wood.

However, what if we asked the mRNA question: Can the production of electricity from solar be re-engineered to use significantly advanced technology over what is currently available? If so, that may enable the plant to be a ‘next technology generation’ solar plant that sets a whole new standard.

The whole basis of the current argument that the investment can never be commercially viable because the Chinese have a stranglehold on the existing technology and cost structure is out the window. A new plant using new technology, delivering lower cost structures and capital productivity would make the current dominating technology redundant.

The intensity of intellectual effort required to ask and investigate these alternative questions is extreme.

The odds of one of them identifying an opportunity that is, with the benefit of hindsight, a ‘unicorn’ is tiny, so the political risk is significant. However, if we allow ourselves to be seduced by the fantasy of doing more of what has resulted in our current situation and expecting a better outcome, we will deserve the shellacking the investment will receive.

Two years ago I had a shot, and nominated three headline domains where we should be investing, and my views have not changed. Sitting under these three headlines are a host of opportunities for a focused R&D effort that should be considered by experts in the various fields, choices made, and long-term investment locked in.

Header is from the extensive StrategyAudit slide bank.